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MOVING BEYOND BITCOIN TO AN ENDOGENOUS THEORY OF
DECENTRALIZED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY REGULATION:
AN INITIAL PROPOSAL
CARLA

L. REYES*

INTRODUCTION

T

HE world is captivated by the emergence of decentralized ledger technologies1 such as the blockchain 2 and their increasingly widespread
use to facilitate everything from decentralized payments3 to a decentral* J.D., LL.M. in International & Comparative Law, Duke University School of
Law; M.P.P., Duke University Terry Sanford School of Public Policy. I am grateful
for feedback received from my colleagues at Perkins Coie LLP, who work in the
trenches with me on these issues. I would also like to thank my husband, Mario C.
Reyes, for his unwavering support.
1. This Article uses the terms decentralized ledger technology or decentralized ledger
technologies to refer broadly to distributed network technology that (1) enables
users to upload programs and to leave the programs to self-execute; (2) maintains
a permanent and public record (ledger) of the current and past states of every
program; (3) is decentralized; (4) uses public key cryptography for authentication;
and (5) uses economic incentives to ensure that the network maintains the technology. SeeVitalik Buterin, Visions, Part 1: The Value of Blockchain Technology, ETHEREUM BLOG (Apr. 13, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-Ithe-value-of-blockchain-technology/
[https://perma.cc/F3RB-E4TA]. The term
decentralized ledger technology as used in this Article is therefore broad enough to
encompass the blockchain that underlies the bitcoin payments application, which
is currently receiving incredible attention, but is not so narrow as to exclude other
forms of the technology or other practical applications other than payments. The
term therefore intends to capture other distributed technology-such as Ripple
and Ethereum-and is not intended to reference any one application of the
technology.
2. The "blockchain" is the decentralized ledger technology that powers the
payments application known as bitcoin. At a high level, the blockchain "cornbin [es] peer-to-peer networks, cryptographic algorithms, distributed data storage,
and a decentralized consensus mechanisms [sic]" to "provide[ I a way for people
to agree on a particular state of affairs and record that agreement in a secure and
verifiable manner." Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, DecentralizedBlockchain
Technology and the Rise ofLex Cryptographia 4-5, 5 & n.15 (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks20l5/up
loads/proposal-background-paper/SSRN-id2580664.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7
HM-4GG7].
3. Although bitcoin, the decentralized virtual currency that may be exchanged through the blockchain, is currently receiving the most widespread attention, bitcoin itself is simply one payments-related application of the underlying
technology. It is worth noting here that this Article adopts the term decentralized
virtual currency to refer to decentralized payments applications because that term is
now commonplace in the industry. However, the term decentralized virtual currency
itself was somewhat controversial just several years ago. Decentralized virtual currency
only became widely adopted as a term after the U.S. Department of Treasury's
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) released its guidance on virtual
currencies on March 18, 2013. In that document, FinCEN defined decentralized
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ized Internet of Things. 4 Software developers, 5 start-up companies, 6 and
venture capitalists 7 all jubilantly declare the efficiency-maximizing, 8 costreducing, 9 and accessibility-enhancing' 0 characteristics of decentralized
cryptographic technologies. Academics predict that the blockchain and
virtual currency as "virtual currency (1) that has no central repository and no single
administrator, and (2) that persons may obtain by their own computing or manufacturing effort." U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2013G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, ExCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENcIEs 5 (2013) [hereinafter FINCEN, VIRTUAL
CURRENCY GUIDANCE], https://www.fincen.gov/statutesregs/guidance/pdf/FIN2013-G001.pdf [https://perma.cc/49PB-SU55]. Without assuming its accuracy,
this Article adopts FinCEN's definition of decentralized virtual currency.
4. See generally VEENA PURESWARAN & PAUL

BRODY,

IBM INST. FOR Bus. VALUE,
(2015), http:/

DEVICE DEMOCRACY: SAVING THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS

/public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/gb/en/gbe3620usen/GBEO3620USEN
.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKG9-NPXR].
5. For example, the Open Mustard Seed Framework, being developed by ID3,
combines blockchain technology with other decentralized technology with the intent "to provide a powerful new self-deploying and self-administering infrastructure layer for the Internet, which gives individuals control over their identities and
their data, and which enables the formation and self-governance of Decentralized
Autonomous Organizations, Authorities, and Enterprises for the creation and exchange of 'digital assets."' Open Mustard Seed (OMS) Framework, ID3, https://id
cubed.org/open-platform/platform/ [https://perma.cc/R7G9-FA63] (last visited
Feb. 28, 2016).
6. See, e.g., CHANGETIP, www.changetip.com [https://perma.cc/XLZ7-MB6D]
(last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (providing "a love button for the Internet" through
which users can engage in micro-tipping using bitcoin); COINBASE, www.coinbase
.com [https://perna.cc/EF2Y-YYPP?type=image] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (providing Bitcoin wallet; sales, purchases, and exchange services); COINBEYOND, www
.coinbeyond.com [https://perma.cc/GPX3-EU3W] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016)
(providing bitcoin merchant services).
7. See Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2014, http://
[https://perma
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/?-r=0
.cc/5MY8-378P].
Bitcoin is the first practical solution to a longstanding problem in
computer science called the Byzantine Generals Problem....
The practical consequence of solving this problem is that Bitcoin
gives us, for the first time, a way for one Internet user to transfer a unique
piece of digital property to another Internet user, such that the transfer is
guaranteed to be safe and secure, everyone knows that the transfer has
taken place, and nobody can challenge the legitimacy of the transfer.
The consequences of this breakthrough are hard to overstate.
Id.
8. See BRIAN KELLY, THE BITCOIN BIG BANG: How ALTERNATIVE CURRENCIES ARE
ABOUT TO CHANGE THE WORLD 163 (2015) ("Decentralization places the economic
power into the hands of the citizens and removes many of the regulations that
prevent capitalism from functioning efficiently.").

9. SeeJ.

ANTHONY MALONE, BrrcOIN AND OTHER VIRTUAL CURRENCIES FOR THE

21ST CENTURY 47 (2014) ("Because there is no third party intermediary, Bitcoin
transactions are substantially cheaper and quicker than traditional payment
methods.").
10. See id. ("It has been estimated that half of the adults worldwide are unbanked due to barriers such as high costs, physical distance, and lack of infrastruc-
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similar technologies will revolutionize the way people order their affairs
and conduct transactions through the evolution of smart contracts, 11 de15
12
centralized autonomous organizations, distributed property registries,
and distributed and secure data stores. 14 Although similarly captivated by
15
individual regulators,1 6
these developing technologies, governments,
17
and various policy makers remain less optimistic that the good contributions of the technology will outweigh the way bad actors use the technology for illicit purposes.

ture and documentation. Bitcoin can exist wherever there is Internet or cell
phone access and the requisite hardware." (footnote omitted)).
11. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 10-12.
12. See William Mougayar, Wat Does It Take to Succeed as a DecentralizedAutonomous Organization?,COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/succeedas-decentralized-autonomous-organization/ [https://perma.cc/3NJZ-34BY].
13. See generallyJoshuaA.T. Fairfield, BitProperty,88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (2015)
[hereinafter Fairfield, BitProperty].
14. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 12-13.
15. For example, China's central bank completely prohibits financial institutions from handling fiat currency derived from bitcoin transactions. See Bloomberg News, China Bans Financial Companies from Bitcoin Transactions, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-05/china-spboc-bans-financial-companies-from-bitcoin-transactions
[https: //perma.cc/
V5WD-6BQE]. Bolivia similarly bans the use of bitcoin and other decentralized
virtual currencies. See Pete Rizzo, Bolivia's Central Bank Bans Bitcoin, COINDESK
(June 19, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/bolivias-central-bank-bans-bitcoin-digital-currencies/ [https://perna.cc/6DZY-PV3X]. Russia has considered whether
to pass a similar ban on cryptocurrency. See Allen Scott, Russia's Bitcoin Ban Expected in August; Expert Recommends Businesses 'Get Out,' COINTELEGRAPH (Apr. 2,
2015), http://cointelegraph.com/news/113857/russias-bitcoin-ban-expected-inaugust-expert-recommends-businesses-get-out
[https://perma.cc/YUU2-HA3K].
Other examples of government skepticism of decentralized virtual currency
abound.
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., FinCEN, Prepared Remarks at the
Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) 19th Annual
International AML and Financial Crime Conference 2 (Mar. 18, 2014), transcript
available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/speech/pdf/20140318.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5E3-4ZYD] ("Indeed, the idea that illicit actors might exploit
the vulnerabilities of virtual currency to launder money is not merely theoretical.
We have seen both centralized and decentralized virtual currencies exploited by
illicit actors.").

17. See, e.g.,

CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, POLICY ON STATE VIRTUAL CUR-

RENCY REGULATION 1 (Dec. 16, 2014), available at http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/
ep/Documents/CSBS%20Policy%20on%20State%20Virtual%2OCurrency%2Reg
ulation%20-%2ODec.%2016%202014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7SE4-FKVG]
("State regulators have determined that certain virtual currency activities raise concerns in the areas of consumer protection, marketplace stability, and law
enforcement.").
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Under the weight of various historical indicators 18 and in the wake of
significant recent events, 19 regulators adopted an increasingly aggressive
approach to enforcing existing regulations against the drastically new, different, and emerging technology. 20 The resulting barriers to entry 21 and
climate of legal stigma 22 are stifling the nascent decentralized technology
industry and preventing further innovation. In response, the decentralized virtual currency industry and other businesses interested in exploring
the potential uses of decentralized technologies in commerce call for selfregulation. 23 Current literature, for its part, suggests a variety of regulatory models with each approach varying in light of the characteristics of
the underlying technology that the commentator suggesting the model
24
considers to threaten the most potential harm.
History intimates that the self-regulatory approach is unlikely to sufficiently resolve the market failures that will ultimately allow illicit and
fraudulent uses of decentralized technologies to occur. Meanwhile, the
regulatory approaches suggested in the literature each impose a new regulatory barrier to entry even while trying to alleviate the inefficiencies of the
18. See generally Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now
After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RIcH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014) (providing detailed historical review of illicit and criminal uses of bitcoin).
19. See, e.g., Application and Affidavit for Seizure Warrant, In the Matter of
the Seizure of the Contents of One Dwolla Account, No. 13-1162 SKG (D. Md.
May 14, 2013) [hereinafter Application for Seizure Warrant], available at http://
cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-Gox-Dwolla-Warrant-5-1413.pdf [http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-GoxDwolla-Warrant-5-14-13.pdfl; Notice of Finding That Liberty Reserve S.A. Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 34169-01
(June 6, 2013) [hereinafter FinCEN, Notice of Finding].
20. See, e.g., FINCEN, VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE, supra note 3; Kashmir
Hill, Every Important Person in BitcoinJust Got Subpoenaed by New York's FinancialRegulator,FORBES (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/
12/every-important-person-in-bitcoin-just-got-subpoenaed-by-new-yorks-financialregulator/.
21. Prior to the announcement of the Virtual Currency Guidance, state regulators remained silent about the potential for their existing laws to regulate decentralized virtual currency. The federal action seemed to spark a wave of activity at
the state level as well. In fact, the state regulatory barriers to entry are now so high
that they prevent even established players, such as Coinbase Inc., from entering all
markets. SeeJamie Redman, Coinbase to Stop Service in Wyoming Due to 'Impractical'
Regulations, COINTELEGRAPH (June 4, 2015), http://cointelegraph.com/news/
114470/coinbase-to-stop-service-in-wyoming-due-to-impractical-regulations
[https://perma.cc/7ZKG-A9GM].
22. See Robin Sidel, Bitcoin Evangelist Is Bound but Not Out, WALL ST. J.,June 30,
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-evangelist-is-bound-but-not-out-140418
5518 [https://perma.cc/LA7X-UGZT].
23. See, e.g., Standards, DIGITAL ASSET TRANSFER AUTHORITY, http://info.dat
authority.org/wordpress/standards/ [https://perma.cc/FG2M-UPS2] (last visited
Feb. 28, 2016).
24. See, e.g., Omri Marian, A ConceptualFrameworkfor the Regulation of C(ryptocurrencies, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. DIALOGUE 53 (2015) (suggesting target anonymity to curb
criminal uses); Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2 (suggesting do-nothing approach
because encouraging innovation is tantamount).
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current landscape. This Article suggests a different approach, one designed to encourage organic regulation that both addresses potential market and governance failures and takes into account the unique nature of
the technology at issue.
This Article lays the foundation for adopting an endogenous theory
of decentralized technology regulation. Drawing on theories of endogenous economic regulation, endogenous development, and functional financial regulation, this Article proposes that decentralized technologies,
including the blockchain technology underlying decentralized payment
systems such as bitcoin, are robust enough to support a theory of endogenous, technology-assisted regulation. Specifically, when this Article proposes an endogenous theory of regulation, it suggests that regulators
undertake the dual task of enacting a law or regulation via statute and
then implementing that statute through code by engaging in an iterative
and cooperative process with the technologies' core developers and with
consensus from the network, so that regulation is endogenously incorporated into the decentralized ledger technology and the applications running on top of the technology.
This Article makes the case for such an approach in five parts. Part I
briefly introduces the decentralized ledger technology ecosystem, setting
the stage for the rest of the Article by focusing on the protocol layer
before addressing applications that might run on the protocol, such as
bitcoin payments. Part II examines the current regulatory landscape,
describing the "law lag" experienced by the decentralized ledger technology ecosystem and evaluating whether the choice between ex ante and ex
post regulation is contributing to the lag. In light of the technology, its
present uses, and the current regulatory landscape facing those uses,
Part III proposes a set of criteria for constructing a regulatory framework
for decentralized ledger technology and evaluates the alternative regulatory approaches that have been considered to date in light of those criteria. Ultimately, Part III identifies a regulatory lacuna common to both the
present landscape and the alternative proposals presented in the literature. Part IV synthesizes an endogenous theory of decentralized ledger
technology regulation from concepts found in economic regulation, international development, comparative law, and financial regulation
literature.
In particular, Part IV argues that the regulatory approach with the
potential to fulfill a majority of the criteria to a high degree is an endogenous, or functional, approach that simultaneously governs from within
and without, and sidesteps the ex ante/ex post regulatory dichotomy by
building compliance into the protocol as regulation-through-code. Linking the endogenous regulatory approach to the academic discourse re-

196

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: p. 191

garding Lawrence Lessig's concept of code-as-law, 25 this Article proposes
regulation that is endogenous at two levels: (1) as an iterative and cooperative process requiring participation of both regulators and industry actors
approaching regulation design from a functional perspective and (2) as
regulation implemented literally from within the decentralized ledger system as part of its operative code. Recognizing certain practical and theoretical challenges to implementing this endogenous theory, this Article
concludes by identifying areas for further research and suggesting ways
that successful implementation could disrupt core aspects of regulatory
theory.
I.

THE DECENTRALIZED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY ECOSYSTEM:

A

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

Commentators often compare the technical development and stages
of public adoption of bitcoin to the development of the Internet. 26 The
reality, however, is that the technical development and public adoption of
bitcoin is better compared to the development and adoption of Internet
Explorer or Apple TV (both of which are applications that run on the
underlying Internet technology), while the development and adoption of
the blockchain is akin to that of the Internet. Bitcoin is simply one application, a payments application, of the blockchain technology on which it
runs. Further, the blockchain is just one of a variety of similar technologies often referred to as decentralized public ledgers or trustless public
ledgers. 27 Because failure to appreciate these distinctions constitutes a
core element in the regulatory difficulty facing entrepreneurs integrating
decentralized ledger technology into their products and services, a brief
introduction to the varied technology that makes up the decentralized
ledger ecosystem, including decentralized public ledgers such as the
blockchain, decentralized payments applications such as bitcoin, and
other decentralized applications of the technology is warranted. 28 As the
25. See Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Governance, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1405, 1408 (1999) [hereinafter Lessig, Open Code and
Open Societies].
The code of cyberspace-whether the Internet, or a net within the Internet-defines that space. It constitutes that space. And as with any
constitution, it builds within itself a set of values and possibilities that
governs life there.... And the design of code is something that people
are doing. Engineers make the choices about how the world will be. Engineers in this sense are governors.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Daniel Folkinshteyn, Mark Lennon & Tim Reilly, A Tale of Twin
Tech: Bitcoin and the WVWW 10 J. STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. 82 (2015); Clifton B.
Parker, The Promise and Peril ofBitcoin, STAN. GRADUATE Scll. Bus. (Feb. 25, 2014),

http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/headlines/promise-peril-bitcoin
ma.cc/DX2S-JNLY].

[https://per

27. See generally Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 13.

28. An exhaustive explanation of each of these elements is beyond the scope
of this Article, and, as will be evident by the discussion that follows, this effort has
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ultimate goal of this Article is to flesh out the initial contours of a regulatory approach that operates as organically and fluidly as the technology
itself, this Section begins with an examination of decentralized ledgers
and then describes various applications of that technology, such as bitcoin.
This Section sets the tone for the regulatory approach ultimately proposed
(which focuses on regulating the decentralized ledger technology, rather
than the applications of that technology) and develops a common language for use throughout the rest of the Article.
A.

DecentralizedLedger Technologies, Including the Blockchain

Decentralized ledger technologies "combin[e] peer-to-peer networks,
cryptographic algorithms, distributed data storage, and [ ] decentralized
consensus mechanisms" to enable "people to agree on a particular state of
affairs and record that agreement in a secure and verifiable manner. 29 In
other words, decentralized ledger technologies create "online lists, maintained by no one and available to everyone, [and] are maintained by a
consensus protocol." 30 In the case of bitcoin, the decentralized public
ledger is referred to as the blockchain. 3 1 The blockchain is "a chronological database of transactions recorded by a network of computers,"3 2 which
is encrypted and broken into smaller sets of aggregated transactions called
34
"blocks." 33 A block is often described as "a container data structure,"
that groups transactions, marks them with a timestamp, and connects
them to the previous block in the blockchain. 35 A new block of aggrealready been eloquently undertaken by others. Instead, this Section explains the
components of the decentralized ledger technology ecosystem that are important
to understand before attempting to undertake the regulatory enterprise.
29. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 4, 5.
30. Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REv. ONLINE 35, 36 (2014) [hereinafter Fairfield, Bitcoin Bots].
31. See MALONE, supra note 9, at 35; Paul H. Farmer, Jr., Note & Comment,
Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & the Need for Legal Innovation, 9 J. Bus.

& TECH. L. 85, 88-89 (2014) ("The Bitcoin peer-to-peer network that allows for
miners to generate Bitcoins also serves as a public ledger for all Bitcoin transac-

tions. A timestamp server records the time of creation of each Bitcoin and any
other Bitcoin transaction within the network. The full record of transactions is
called a block chain, a sequence of records composing a virtual ledger." (footnotes
omitted)).

32. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 6 (citation omitted); see also PAUL
VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRvTOCURRENcY: How BITCOIN AND DIGIORDER 124 (2015) ("The
blockchain doesn't live on a single computer or server but ... is shared around
that community of computer owners, or nodes.").
33. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Blockchain, BITCOIN
FOUND. WInu, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block-chain (last visited Mar. 1, 2015))

TAL MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also MALONE, supra note 9, at 35.
34. ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN 160 (2015).
35. See id. at xix; Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 7.
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gated transactions will only be added to the ledger after "the computers
3 6
on the network reach consensus as to the validity of the transaction.
In the case of bitcoin, the method for reaching consensus is referred
to as mining, a process of solving complex mathematical problems to validate the block. 37 Mining is an example of a proof-of-work consensus
model. 3 8 A proof-of-work consensus model "require[s] the client requesting the service prove that some work has been done" in order to process
the request. 39 Other decentralized ledger technologies employ different
consensus models. For example, the Ripple protocol, a shared, public,
distributed database, 40 validates transactions by creating a candidate list of
transactions that is distributed to and voted on by a subset of trusted
nodes, called the "unique node list." 4 1 The candidate set of transactions is
validated and becomes part of the permanent, authoritative ledger once
the "voting of server nodes reaches a consensus of 80% .... 1-42 In a third
36. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 7; see also Fairfield, BitProperty, supra
note 13, at 814 ("The Bitcoin protocol creates a ledger out of a series of groups of
transactions, termed simply 'blocks,' which as a whole form a log of all transfers,
termed the 'block chain.' The block chain is not maintained by any single entity,
but instead relies on a mathematically innovative consensus model." (footnote
omitted)).
37. See ANTONOPOULOS, supranote 34, at xx (describing miner as "[a] network
node that finds valid proof of work for new blocks, by repeated hashing"); MALONE, supra note 9, at 36.

38. See PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING,
AND ECONOMICS 101 (2015) ("To secure the blockchain-the distributed transaction database-Bitcoin requires proof-of-work to be performed on blocks of transactions following the Solution-Verification protocol.").
39. Id. at 100; see also ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 34, at xx (defining proof-ofwork as "[a] piece of data that requires significant computation to find. In bitcoin,
miners must find a numeric solution to the SHA256 algorithm that meets a network-wide target, the difficulty target."); Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 7
n.29 (citing Joseph Bonneau et al., SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for
Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies, 36 SECURITY & PRIVACY (IEEE, San Fran., Cal.), May
18-20, 2015, available at www.jbonneau.com/doc/BMCNKF15-IEEESP-bitcoin
.pdf.) ("The Proof of Work consensus mechanism requires that certain computers
on the network (colloquially referred to as a [sic] 'miners') solve computationallyintensive mathematical puzzles, while others verify that the solution to that puzzle
does not correspond to a previous transaction.").
40. See Bryant Gehring, How Ripple Works, RIPPLE (Oct. 16, 2014), https://ripple.com/knowledge-center/how-ripple-works/ [https://perma.cc/6LRU-E9JZ].
41. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall, The Bitcoin Question: Currency Versus Trust-Less
Transfer Technology 15 (OECD Working Papers on Fin., Ins. & Private Pensions, No.
37, 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/The-Bit
coin-Question-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4D5-ZRZ4]; see also DAVID SCHWARTZ,
NOAH YOUNGS & ARTHUR BRITro, RIPPLE LABs, INC., THE RIPPLE PROTOCOL CONSENSUS ALGORITHM 3 (2014), available at https://ripple.com/files/rippleconsensus_
whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4WL-TQLA].
42. Blundell-Wignall, supra note 41, at 15; see also SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note
41, at 4. At least one commentator has referred to this approach as a "Byzantine
agreement system;" however, the creators of the Ripple protocol do not themselves
adopt that terminology. See generally DAVID MAZIPRES, STELLAR DEV. FOUND., THE
STELLAR CONSENSUS PROTOCOL: A FEDERATED MODEL FOR INTERNET-LEVEL CONSEN-

sus (2015)

(draft), available at https://www.stellar.org/papers/stellar-consensus-
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consensus model, "voting rights depend on the amount of resources (e.g.,
43
a virtual currency) held by every computer connected to the network."
Researchers are presently pursuing the development of other consensus
44
models as well.
Regardless of the consensus method used, these decentralized public
ledgers all share key qualities that make the technology revolutionary: they
are distributed, run on peer-to-peer networks, and offer a public, permanent record management system "that does not require trust in other parties or in a central list authority, and is robustly resistant to falsification,"
employing known technology. 45 The technologies are also generally
open-source and non-proprietary, meaning that no single person or entity
controls the decentralized public ledgers. 46 Rather, the technology was
developed, and is maintained and updated "by a worldwide collaborative
community of volunteer[ ]" programmers. 47 The community can make
improvements to the underlying code and alter the function of the
blockchain protocol by proposing the code change and obtaining network
48
consensus.
B.

DecentralizedApplications, IncludingBitcoin and Smart Contracts

There are a variety of applications for decentralized public ledger
technologies such as the blockchain. Currently, the most well-known of
those applications is decentralized virtual currency. Bitcoin is the decentralized virtual currency that runs on the blockchain. 49 "Bitcoins are computer files, similar to an mp3 or a text file and can be destroyed or lostjust
protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2AG-ZDMF]. A similar, but not identical, approach is adopted by the Stellar Consensus Protocol, which it terms a "Federated
Byzantine Agreement" consensus model. See id.
43. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 7 n.30; see also Nicolas Houy, It Will
Cost You Nothing to "Kill"a Proof-of-Stake Cypto-Currency, 34 ECON. BULL. 1038, 1040
(2014), available at http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2014/Volume34/EB14-V34-I2-P96.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6PH-4WZZ] (describing proof-of-stake as

consensus mechanism in which "the expected reward for inserting transactions in
the blockchain does not depend on the computational power of miners but on the
amount of crypto-currency they already own").
44. See, e.g., IDDO BENTOV, CHARLEs LEE, ALEX MIZRAHI & MENI ROSENFELD,
PROOF OF ACTmTr: EXTENDING BITCOIN'S PROOF OF WORK VIA PROOF OF STAKE

(2014), available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/452.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F
AM-HDJA].
45. Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 13, at 808.
46. See MALONE, supra note 9, at 34.
47. Id.
48. See Sarah Jeong, The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless Currency 31 (May 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http://www
.modernmoneynetwork.org/sites/default/files/biblio/Bitcoin%20Protocol% 20as
%20Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/43S9-V75G] ("There is evidence that community
consensus can result in the resolution of crisis.").

49. See

MALONE,

supra note 9, at 35.
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like cash." 50 Just as an mp3 file can be stored either locally on the owner's
computer or remotely through a cloud service, bitcoins can be stored either on the owner's computer or with an online service, called a wallet
provider or an exchange. 5 1 When bitcoin owners refer to storing their
bitcoins in a "wallet," the reference is to the public-key encryption tech52
nique used to secure bitcoins and bitcoin transactions.
Specifically, a wallet is made of two mathematically related keys: a private key and a public key. 53 The public key is the outward facing destination address of the wallet, like a bank account number or an email
address. 54 The private key functions as a PIN to a bank account or a password to an email address. 55 To execute a transaction, bitcoin owners use
their private key to authorize the transfer of bitcoin to the public address
representing the recipient's wallet. 5 6 The total amount of bitcoins is

capped at 21 million, 57 and as a scarce resource with no government-affixed price, the value of an individual bitcoin is set by market forces.5 8
Other decentralized virtual currencies run on other protocols layered on
top of the blockchain 59 or run as payments applications on other
protocols. 60
50. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Student Article, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the PrivateDigital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 Loy. CONSUMER L. Ruv. 111, 116
(2012).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 117.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. For a more complete description of how wallets are created,
bitcoins are stored, and transactions are signed using the public-private key encryption pair, see Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32
QUINNIPIAc L. REv.

135, 141-45 (2013).

56. See Danton Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering:Miningfor an Effective Solution, 89 IND. L.J. 441, 446 (2014).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 445; see also Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative
Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS ScI. & TECH. L.J. 159, 160 (2012) ("Bitcoin is a digital,

decentralized, partially anonymous currency, not backed by any government or
other legal entity, and not redeemable for gold or other commodity.").
59. An example of this was Mastercoin, which was "an entirely new network of
currencies, commodities and securities on top of Bitcoin itself." Vitalik Buterin,

Mastercoin:A Second-GenerationProtocol on the Bitcoin Blockchain, BITcoIN MAG. (Nov.
4, 2013), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/7961/mastercoin-a-second-generationprotocol-on-the-bitcoin-blockchain/ [http://perma.cc/53D8-MFKD]. Mastercoin
sought to use the blockchain "as a protocol layer, on top of which new currency
layers with new rules can be built without changing the foundation." Id. (quoting
J.R. WILETT, THE SECOND BITCOIN WHITEPAPER (2012) (draft), available at https://

sites.google.com/site/2ndbtcwpaper/2ndBitcoinWhitepaper.pdfattredirects=0)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
60. The Ripple Protocol, for example, allows users to transfer "Balances,"
which represent fiat currency deposited with a gateway. Ripple describes it as
follows:
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Smart contracts represent another application of decentralized public
ledger technology that is beginning to garner attention. Smart contracts
can be thought of as self-executing transactions, or as "automated programs that transfer digital assets within the block-chain upon certain triggering conditions ....
-61 IBM has demoed a working prototype of a
washing machine that orders its own detergent using the smart contracting applications of distributed ledger technology. 62 In practice, entrepreneurs rely on decentralized ledger technology, including the smart
contracting features of that technology, to create decentralized marketplaces, 63 decentralized crowdfunding applications, 64 and distributed securities. 65 The more theoretical potential applications for distributed
ledger technology include independently wealthy software, 6 6 zero-member

LLCs, 6 7

and

decentralized

autonomous

organizations, 68

among

others.
Despite the potentially broad applications of decentralized ledger
technology, regulatory efforts predominately center on payments applicaUSD balances traded on the Ripple protocol are redeemable at the specific "gateway" from which the currency was issued. A gateway is the place
where fiat money enters and exits the Ripple protocol. In practice, this
can look very similar to traditional banks. However, a gateway can be any
business that provides access to the Ripple protocol. Gateways can be
banks, money service businesses, marketplaces, or any other financial
institution.
Gehring, supra note 40.
61. Fairfield, Bitcoin Bots, supra note 30, at 38. Smart contracts have also been
defined as "cryptographic 'boxes' that contain value and only unlock it if certain
conditions are met." Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 10 n.46 (quoting Vitalik
Buterin, A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application Platform,
GITHUB (last edited Jan. 5, 2015), https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/
White-Paper) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 15 n.71; see also PuEswAIAN &
BRODY,

supra note 4.

63. Two examples of this include OpenBazaar and Bitmarkets. SeeJoon Ian
Wong, Bitmarkets Launches Decentralised Bitcoin Marketplace with Tor Support,
CoINDEsK (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/bitmarkets-launches-decen
tralised-bitcoin-marketplace-tor-support/ [https://perma.cc/5UQC-4U92].
64. An example includes BlockTrust, an "all-inclusive funding platform for
Blockchain projects with project certification and ClearingHouse notarization services, along with multi-sig Bitcoin escrow." Diana Ngo, BlockTrust Launches
CrowdfundingPlatformfor Blockchain-BasedProjects, COINTELEGRAPH (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://cointelegraph.com/news/113146/blocktrust-launches-crowdfunding-platform-for-blockchain-based-projects [https://perma.cc/8KUW-FLU6].
65. See Cade Metz, Overstock Files to Offer Stock That Works Like Bitcoin, WIRED
(Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/overstock-files-offer-stock-workslike-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/B2H4-CK8M].
66. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the ZeroMember LLC, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. 1485, 1492-95 (2014).
67. See id. at 1496-98.
68. For a description of the possible use case for a democratic autonomous

organization, see generally

ETHEREUM

FRONTIER,

https://www.ethereum.org/

[https://perma.cc/GG6Q-36WA] (last visited Feb. 28, 2016); see also Wright & De
Filippi, supra note 2, at 15-17.
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fions of decentralized ledger technologies, including bitcoin. Unfortunately, "[t] he danger is that this could imperil innovations built on top of
the [blockchain] that do not fit a financial services model." 69 Indeed,
such regulation has already made it more difficult for companies integrating decentralized ledger technologies into their products and services to
obtain and maintain banking relationships that enable the company to
function;70 enter certain markets within the United States; 71 and develop
alternative use cases for the technology without fear of inadvertently violating financial services laws. 72 To understand why the current regulatory
landscape is marked by such dedication to taming bitcoin to the exclusion
of all other uses of the technology, it is important to know the regulatory
history of virtual currency generally.
II.

THIS PRESENT DARKNESS: DECENTRALIZED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY
REGULATION IN A CENTRALIZED AGE

At its core, the regulatory enterprise involves creating appropriate incentives to coax desired behavior out of market actors to address externalities otherwise naturally caused by the pursuit of maximizing private
interests. 73 The ever-present dilemma of regulators involves whether to
offer the incentive before (ex ante) or after (ex post) the activity at issue
takes place.7 4 In the context of the decentralized ledger technology
ecosystem, determining which incentives to present and when to present
them is further complicated by the "law lag," a term often used in law and
technology literature to refer to the circumstances in which "existing legal
provisions are inadequate to deal with a social, cultural or commercial
context created by rapid advances in information and communication
technology .... "-75 This Section evaluates the present state of decentral69. Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 13, at 830 (citation omitted).
70. See Evander Smart, Banks Handcuff Bitcoin Businesses in Opening Bank Ac-

counts,

CRYPTOCOINSNEws

(Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/

ban ks-handcuff-bitcoin-businesses-opening-bank-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/H7
ZN-27YR].
71. See Redman, supra note 21.
72. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN., ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2015-ROO, APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ISSUING PHYSICAL OR DIGITAL NEGOTIABLE CERTIFICATES OF OWNERSHIP OF PRECIOUS METAL (2015) [hereinafter

FINCEN, DIGITAL CERTIFICATES], available at http://www.fincen.gov/news-room/
rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2015-R001 .pdf [https://perma.cc/7JZ5-WGUL].
73. See generally Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REv.
1715 (2015).
74. See generally Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The
Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977) (exploring
choice between regulating ex ante and punishing ex post).
75. Jeremy Pitt & Ada Diaconescu, The Algorithmic Governance of Common-Pool
Resources, in FROM BITCOIN TO BURNING MAN AND BEYOND: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY
AND AUTONOMY IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY

130, 137-38 (John H. Clippinger & David

Bollier eds., 2014), availableat https://drive.google.com/file/d/B2aVIexl9TLZSk
NfTGxOU29WcHc/view [https://perma.cc/ZG27-M26S].
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ized technology regulation in the United States. Despite the robustness of
decentralized public ledger technology and its myriad potential uses, regulatory activity to date has focused on the decentralized virtual currency
applications of such technology, with most prominent attention directed
at bitcoin. This focus is partially explained by the fact that decentralized
virtual currencies are the first and most widely adopted use of the underlying technology, receiving extensive media coverage and venture-capital attention. However, a full understanding of the present regulatory focus on
decentralized virtual currency can only be achieved by looking at the recent regulatory history. To that end, this Section offers a brief overview of
the regulatory developments in the decentralized ledger technology
ecosystem to date.
This Section begins in the same spot in which regulators found themselves when bitcoin and the blockchain were introduced in 2009: addressing anti-money laundering and other criminal activity in the centralized
technology context, including centralized virtual currencies. This Section
then examines how regulators have attempted to apply the same regulatory lessons and policy priorities prevalent in the centralized context to
decentralized ledger technology regulation. At each step, this Section
considers the extent to which efforts are proceeding ex ante or ex post
and queries whether preferences for one over the other vary in light of
industry developments at the time. This Section concludes by examining
the impact of the current regulatory landscape on the decentralized
ledger technology industry and attempts to identify the regulatory gaps
that leave actors in the industry facing regulatory uncertainty and railing
against their very real experience with law lag.
A.

The Backdrop: Regulating Centralized Technology

The largest virtual currency-related legal development before the
open-sourced bitcoin protocol was released in 2009 was the prosecution of
E-Gold, Ltd. (E-Gold). E-Gold was a centralized virtual currency allegedly
backed by physical gold reserves. 7 6 E-Gold users could register for an account using an email address without verification of any identifying information. 7 7 As a result, E-Gold accounts existed under names such as
78
"Mickey Mouse," "Anonymous Man," "bud wieser," and "No Name."
The E-Gold currency and the E-Gold platform became popular among
criminals and money launderers, prompting various law enforcement ac76. See Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-A-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital
CurrencyExchanges Won't Stop Online Money Laundering, 18 LEwis & CiLAR L. REv. 1,
24 (2014); Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cyptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 813, 823 (2014).
77. See Christopher, supra note 76, at 24.
78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Middlebrook & Hughes,
supra note 76, at 824 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tions between 2005 and 2008. 79 Regulatory and enforcement activity after
E-Gold remained publically quiet until 2013, but it is clear that law enforcement did not remain inactive. For example, the FBI authored an
intelligence assessment, dated April 24, 2012, assessing the challenges
faced in deterring illicit activity undertaken through the use of bitcoin.8 0
The assessment evidences an initial shift in enforcement, from sole focus
on centralized virtual currencies to a growing awareness of the unique regulatory and enforcement challenges posed by decentralized virtual
currencies.
Then, nearly one year later, the federal government publicly unleashed the full weight of the quiet regulatory consideration it had been
directing at decentralized virtual currencies. In March 2013, the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network of the United States Department of the
Treasury (FinCEN) issued guidance on the application of the Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations to virtual currencies (the Virtual Currency Guidance).81 The Virtual Currency Guidance outlines the
applicability of the existing federal anti-money laundering (AML) regime
to convertible virtual currencies, including decentralized virtual currencies, and concludes that administrators and exchangers of such currencies
are subject to the AML requirements to the extent that they transmit decentralized virtual currency or legal tender from one user to another, or
from one location to another.8 2 Shortly after FinCEN issued the Virtual
Currency Guidance, the federal government announced two significant
enforcement actions. First, on May 14, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seized a Dwolla account belonging to Mt. Gox, a leading Japan-based bitcoin exchange. 83 Second, a mere fourteen days later,
FinCEN exercised its powers under Section 311 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act
by designating the Costa Rican company Liberty Reserve a financial insti-

79. See Christopher, supra note 76, at 24. For details on the charges and
guilty pleas entered, see United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82, 90
(D.D.C. 2008).
80. See FBI,

INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT,

(U)

BITCOIN VIRTUAL

CURRENCY-

ACTrvITY
(2012), available at http://wired.com/images blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/BitcoinFBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q9C-g9T3P].
UNIQUE FEATURES PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR DETERRING ILLICIT

81. See FINCEN,

VIRTUAL CURRENCY GUIDANCE,

supra note 3.

82. See id. at 4. For detailed descriptions of the Virtual Currency Guidance,
see generally J. Dax Hansen, Carla L. Reyes & Joseph P. Cutler, New FinCEN Guidance Changes Regulatory Landscapefor Virtual Currencies and Some PrepaidPrograms,
CYBERSPACE LAw. (Thomson/Legalworks, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2013, at 12; Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Virtual Uncertainty:Developments in the
Law of Electronic Payments and Financial Services, 69 Bus. LAw. 263, 264-69 (2013).
83. See Application for Seizure Warrant, supra note 19. DHS alleged that Mt.
Gox's U.S. subsidiary, Mutum Sigillum, LLC, operated an unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012). See id.
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proposing the impositution of primary money laundering concern8 4 and
8 5
tion of special measures against Liberty Reserve.
The Virtual Currency Guidance and the Mt. Gox seizure paved the
way for further regulation of decentralized technology. Key themes from
each of these actions dating back to the beginning of the E-Gold prosecution in 2005 persist. In particular, the regulatory and law enforcement
agencies active in the decentralized ledger technology industry continue
to focus on centralized actors: companies with traditional centralized
structures that just happen to offer products and services linked to a decentralized ledger technology. Further, like E-Gold, Mt. Gox, and Liberty
Reserve, each of which processed very high volumes of transactions, regulators continue to target large-scale operations that offer the potential for
high-impact regulatory or enforcement measures. Finally, and perhaps
more importantly, the focus remains entirely on virtual currency applications of decentralized ledger technology-the decentralized versions of EGold and Liberty Reserve. Notably, this period of regulatory activity evidenced an intent to apply traditional AML and terrorist financing controls, a form of ex ante regulation in the payments space, 8 6 to virtual
currencies, including decentralized virtual currencies. This intent was
made most clear by the Virtual Currency Guidance and Liberty Reserve
special measures, and continues to permeate the current regulatory landscape, as evidenced by the regulatory activity from 2013 to the present.
B.

The Current Landscape: Applying Centralized Themes
to Decentralized Technology

Although state regulators had not yet voiced an opinion on decentralized virtual currency regulation, shortly after the federal Mt. Gox and Liberty Reserve actions, the California Department of Business Oversight
(DBO) sent letters to industry participants in order to gather information
to help the DBO decide how to regulate decentralized virtual currencies

and related activities. 8 7 The New York Department of Financial Services
(NYDFS) quickly followed suit, issuing subpoenas to twenty-two companies
84. See FinCEN, Notice of Finding, supra note 19.
85. See FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Against Liberty Reserve S.A. as
a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 34008
(proposedJune 6, 2013) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010); see alsoJean-Jacques

Cabou, J. Dax Hansen, Carla L. Reyes, Ashley A. Locke & Kieth Miller, Legal LandscapeforE-CurrencyIs Getting More Complicated, LAw 360 (June 3, 2013), http://www
.law360.com/articles/446907/legal-landscape-for-e-currency-is-getting-more-complicated [https://perma.cc/MN2R-6ECQ].
86. See Terri Bradford, Fumiko Hayashi, Christian Hung, Simonetta Rosati,
Richard J. Sullivan, Zhu Wang & Stuart E. Weiner, Nonbanks and Risk in Retail Payments: EU and U.S., in MANAGING INFORMATION RISK AND THE ECONOMICS OF SECURlay 17, 35 (M. Eric Johnson ed., 2009).
87. See, e.g., Letter from Paul T. Crayton, Senior Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Fin.
Inst., to BitCoin Found. (May 30, 2013), available at http://www.scibd.com/doc/
149335233/ca-state-cease-and-desist-may-30 [https://perma.cc/U5PK-G2BY].
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in the decentralized technology ecosystem in August 2013.88 The NYDFS
issued the subpoenas as part of "an inquiry into the appropriate regulatory
guidelines that it should put in place for virtual currencies." 89 Not to be
outdone, the federal government also continued to apply regulatory pressure to the decentralized technology ecosystem. In October 2013, federal
law enforcement agents shut down the Silk Road website and arrested its
founder and administrators, who were charged with a wide range of
crimes, including money laundering, drug trafficking, and computer
90
hacking.
The negative publicity surrounding bitcoin from the Silk Road events
prompted the U.S. Senate to hold public hearings on virtual currencies in
November 2013.91 In her testimony during the Senate hearings, Jennifer
Shasky Calvery, the Director of FinCEN, noted the "attributes that make
virtual currency vulnerable to illicit use" but also recognized the "innovation virtual currencies provide." 92 Early 2014 brought additional federal
criminal prosecutorial activity,93 and the first state prosecutions related to
decentralized virtual currency. 94 Furthermore, states continued to evaluate regulation: in January 2014, the NYDFS held a series of hearings on
virtual currencies, 95 and U.S. state financial services regulators issued
warnings on the risks of virtual currencies, either individually or in collab88. See Greg Farrell, NY. Subpoenas Bitcoin Firms in Probe on Criminal Risk,

(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-12/n-y[https://perma.cc/28L5regulator-subpoenas-firms-over-bitcoin-crime-risks.html
C38K].
89. N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Notice of Inquiry on Virtual Currencies (Aug. 12,
BLOOMBERG

2013), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/letters/ltrl 30812_virtualcurren

cy.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ8J-EFMC].
90. See Kim Zetter, How the Feds Took Down the Silk Road Drug Wonderland,
[https://per
WIRED (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/silk-road/
ma.cc/UDN5-CFQ9].
91. See Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013),
video available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/beyond-silk-road-poten[https://perma.cc/3WHNtial-risks-threats-and-promises-of-virtual-currencies

YN7V].
92. Id. (statement ofJennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., FinCEN).
93. In January 2014, Charlie Shrem, a bitcoin exchange CEO, was arrested
and charged with illegal money transmission and money laundering under federal
laws. See Sidel, supra note 22.
94. In February 2014, two Florida-based users of a bitcoin local trading site
were arrested and charged with illegal money transmission and money laundering
under state laws. See United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Florida v. Reid, No. 14-002935 (Fla. Miami-Dade Cnty. Ct., Sept. 16, 2015); Florida
v. Espinoza, No. 14-002923 (Fla. Miami-Dade Cnty. Ct., filed Feb. 7, 2014).
95. For more information, see generally N.Y. State Dep't of Fin. Servs., NYDFS
Outlines Additional Details on Witnesses and Panels for Virtual Currency Hearing
on January 28 and 29 in New York City (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www
.dfs.ny.gov/about/panelswitnesses virtual currency-hearing.pdf [https://perma
.cc/SP2Z-MNQH].
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oration with other state regulators. 9 6 Other federal regulatory agencies,
including the Internal Revenue Service 97 and the Federal Reserve, also
waded into the decentralized technology morass. 98 Finally, FinCEN issued
96. See generally

CONF. OF STATE

BANK

SUPERVISORS, MODEL STATE CONSUMER

(Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.csbs
.org/legislative/testimony/Documents/ModelConsumerGuidance-Virtual%20
Currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/K63Y-TEU4]. To date, ten states have issued
consumer guidance based on the CSBS model. See Press Release, Susan Bell,
Comm'r, Alaska Dep't of Commerce, Cmty. & Econ. Dev., No. 14-014, Virtual Currency Investor Advisory Alert: What's in Your e-Wallet? (Apr. 30, 2014), available at
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/portals/3/pub/pr-14-014-virtua-currencyinvestor-advisory-alert-043014.pdf [https://perma.cc/S89T-MY4W]; Media Release, Jan Lynn Owen, Comm'r, Cal. Dep't of Bus. Oversight, California Department of Business Oversight Issues Advisory on Virtual Currencies (Apr. 30, 2014),
available at http://www.dbo.ca.gov/Press/press-releases/VCAdvisoryPR_043014
.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9QR-MJ361; Advisory, Idaho Dep't of Fin., What's in
Your e-Wallet? (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://finance.idaho.gov/Securities/
Documents/VirtualCurrencyAdvisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VRL-EWQS]; Investor Alert, Ind. Sec'y of State Secs. Div., What's in Your e-Wallet? (May 12, 2014),
available at http://www.in.gov/sos/files/Virtual-Currency-IN.pdf [https://perma
.cc/M9ZP-KRBE]; Advisory Notice, Md. Comm'r of Fin. Regulation, Virtual Currencies: Risks for Buying, Selling, Transacting, and Investing, No. 14-01 (Apr. 24,
2014), available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/advisories/advisoryvirtual
.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8XZ-3GCG]; News Release, Mo. Sec'y of State, Investor
Alert: Kander Cautions Missouri Investors on Bitcoin (Apr. 24, 2014), availableat
http://www.sos.mo.gov/news.asp?id=1383 [https://perma.cc/AU9Y-RFLY]; Press
Release, Nev. Dep't of Bus. & Indus., Nevada Financial Institutions Division Issues
Consumer and Investor Guidance on Virtual Currency (Apr. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.fid.state.nv.us/GuidanceVirtualCurrency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
NGQ8-5XP6]; Press Release, N.M. Regulation & Licensing Dep't, State Regulations
Alert Consumers About Risks Involved with Investing in Virtual Currencies (Apr.
30, 2014), available at http://www.rld.state.nm.us/uploads/PressRelease/28b4bcd
f4 f8d46899c723b2b76f16 b5b/VirtualCurrency_Warning.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8PYK-J6KE]; Press Release, Pa. Dep't of Banking & Secs., Pennsylvania Banking
and Securities Department Urges Consumers, Businesses and Investors to Be Cautious with New Virtual Currencies (May 19, 2014), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pennsylvania-banking-and-securities-department-urgesconsumers-businesses-and-investors-to-be-cautious-with-new-virtual-currencies-2598
22731.html [https://perma.cc/PH8M-XWFT]; Press Release, George Althoff,
Commc'ns Dir., Wis. Dep't of Fin. Insts., State Agency Warns Consumers to Be
Cautious with Virtual Currencies (Apr. 30, 2014), available at https://www.wdfi
.org/newsroom/press/2014/DFVirtualCurrencyAdvisory.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5LKC-C6PS].
97. In May 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the Department of
Treasury issued a notice classifying bitcoin and similar virtual currencies as property. See I.R.S. Notice 21-16, 2014-21 C.B. 938 (May 19, 2014), availableat https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irbl4-21.pdf [perma.cc/3FDT-56DT].
98. The Federal Reserve, for its part, used 2014 to evolve its thinking regarding bitcoin and other decentralized virtual currencies. On February 27, 2014, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen, in testimony before the Senate Banking
Committee, opined that the Federal Reserve had no role in regulating bitcoin because it is developing outside of the banks that the Federal Reserve has the authority to regulate. See SemiannualMonetary Policy Report to the Cong.: Before the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 1I3th Cong. (2014) (testimony of Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen20l4O2lla.htm [https://perma.cc/RD87-VKDG]. At its
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a series of administrative letter rulings in 2014 intended to clarify the application of the Virtual Currency Guidance to various business models
used in the decentralized technology ecosystem. 99 By the end of 2014,
FinCEN had addressed the status of miners, 100 software development,' 0 '
investment activity, 10 2 virtual4 currency trading platforms,' 0 3 and a virtual
10
currency payment system.
The year 2015 brought similar developments. At the state level, the
NYDFS finalized its BitLicense regime, 10 5 several other states took a waitMay 9, 2014, quarterly meeting, however, the Federal Reserve concluded that
bitcoin did not presently pose a threat to the system, but that "regulation is advisable" to address consumer protection and illicit use. See Fed. Advisory Council &
Bd. of Governors, Record of Meeting 11 (May 9, 2014), available at http://www
.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/fac-20140513.pdf. The Federal Reserve also
noted that "one area of focus should be [b]itcoin's circumvention of currency controls." Id. at 10.
99. See generallyJoseph Cutler, J. Dax Hansen & Carla L. Reyes, Admin Rulings:
FinCEN Clarifies Money TransmitterExemptionsfor Virtual Currency and Payment-Related
Services, JD SuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (June 10, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/
[https://perma.cc/
legalnews/admin-rulings-fincen-clarifies-money-tr-92506/
XF7C-4UBC]; Joseph Cutler, J. Dax Hansen & Carla L. Reyes, New FinCEN Guidance
on Virtual Currency Transactions,JD SuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (Feb. 12, 2014), http://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-fincen-guidance-on-virtual-currency-14922/
[https://perma.cc/L7GC-RFE7]; Carla L. Reyes, FinCEN Issues New Rulings Covering Virtual Currency Exchanges and Payment Processors,JD SuPRA Bus. ADVISOR (Oct.
30, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/fincen-issues-new-rulings-coveringvirtu-44222/ [https://perma.cc/HT3U-YB7F].
100. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2014-R007, APPLICATION OF MONEY SERVICES BUSINESS REGULATIONS TO THE RENTAL OF COMPUTER

SYSTEMS FOR MINING VIRTUAL CURRENCY (Apr. 29, 2014), available at http://www
[https://perma.cc/
.fincen.gov/newsroom/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R007.pdf
J6CG-U2DD]; U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2014-ROO1,
APPLICATION OF

FINCEN's

REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS

(Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/pdf/
FIN-2014-ROO1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XNA-7R3L].
101. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2014-R002, APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY SOFTwARE DEVELOP(Jan. 30, 2014), available at http://www
MENT AND CERTAIN INVESTMENT AclrrV
[https://perma.cc/
.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-R002.pdf

AB7K-22AW].
102. See id.
103. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2014-RO11, REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS

TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://
www.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-ROll.pdf

[https://perma

.cc/KPH2-TMSA].
104. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINCEN, ADMIN. RULING, FIN-2014-R012, REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN's REGULATIONS

TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY PAYMENT SYSTEM (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://www
[https://perma.cc/
.fincen.gov/news-room/rp/rulings/pdf/FIN-2014-RO12.pdf
XC62-KEMF].
105. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 23, §§ 200.1-200.22 (2015), available
at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/adoptions/dfsp200t.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/L58E-QPQP].
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and-see approach, 10 6 and state legislatures, 10 7 the Uniform Law Commission,1 0 8 and the Conference of State Banking Supervisors' 0 9 undertook
legislative drafting efforts with a best practices approach in mind. FinCEN
issued yet another administrative ruling, this time examining the ways in
which digitally issued certificates representing ownership in commodities
(such as gold) intersect with money transmission regulation.' 1 0 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) concluded that bitcoin is a
commodity'
and took enforcement action against two bitcoin-related
businesses for various violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. 1 12 The
CFTC also issued an order of temporary registration as a swap exchange
facility to a third bitcoin-related business, indicating that the CFTC is actively considering and acting upon applications. 1 3 The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) refrained from conclusively ruling how it will
106. See, e.g., Sellers of Checks, Wis. DEP'T FIN. INSTS., https://www.wdfi.org/fi/
lfs/soc/ [https://perma.cc/P4RW-FE3M] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016) ("The division

is unwilling, at this time, to license companies to transmit virtual currency.").
107. See, e.g., Bitcoin Week in Review 06.27.15 - 07.10.15, PERINS CoE (July 10,
2015), http://www.virtualcurrencyreport.com/2015/07/bitcoin-week-in-review-0627-15-07-10-15/ [https://perma.cc/URB8-UAQX] (discussing California's proposed bill AB-1326).
108. See generally NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, REGULATION
OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES ACT (2015) (draft), available at http://www.uniformlaws
.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of%2Ovirtual%20currencies/2015oct RVCA_
Mtg%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH24-SHJ9]; Regulation of Virtual Currencies,
UNIF. L. COMM'N, http://www.uniformlawcommission.com/Committee.aspx?title=
Regulation%20of%2OVirtual%2OCurrencies [https://perma.cc/3VLA-ZHTS] (last
visited Mar. 1, 2016).
109. See generally CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR VIRTUAL CURRENCY ACTIVITIES: CSBS MODEL REGULATORY FRAME-

wORK (2015), available at https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/ep/Documents/CSBSModel-Regulatory-Framework(September%2015%202015).pdf
[https://perma
.cc/AV3R-ZZA8].
110. See FINCEN, DIGITAL CERTIFICATES, supra note 72. The recent CFTC
Complaint against MintCo LLC indicates that the CFTC may also consider itself to
have jurisdiction over such digital commodity certificates, identified by the Virtual
Currency Guidance as a form of convertible virtual currency. See U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. MintCo LLC, 15-cv-61960-BB (S.D. Fla. filed Sept. 16,
2015), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/
@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfmintcocomplaint09l615.pdf
[https://perma
.cc/Z39L-4W3QJ.
111. See Coinflip, Inc., CFTC, Docket No. 15-29, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2015) (order),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/doc
uments/legalpleading/enfcoinfliprorder09l72015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA4WZCUJ].
112. See id.; TeraExchange LLC, CFTC Docket No. 15-33 (Sept. 24, 2015) (order), available at http: //www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions
/documents/legalpleading/enfteraexchangeorder92415.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
PW6U-ZN3C].
113. See LedgerX LLC, CFTC Staff Letter, [Current Decisions] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 133,537 (Sept. 8, 2015), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/
public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/15-49.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PD9YFDM9].
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treat bitcoin, despite efforts from entrepreneurs to force the SEC's hand
by filing shelf registrations for offerings that integrate blockchain technology. 114 Meanwhile, prosecutions for criminal activity perpetrated to some
degree through the use of bitcoin moved forward,1 15 and several consent
orders were entered against decentralized technology companies for fail116
ure to properly comply with the Bank Secrecy Act regulations.
Although federal regulatory agencies, including FinCEN, have carried
out their intent to impose ex ante anti-money laundering regulations on
decentralized virtual currency systems, industry developments have revealed that compliance with those regulations through the mechanics of
the decentralized ledger technology is not always intuitive. As a result,
where practical difficulties or other technology mismatches arise, regulators also used ex post criminal prosecutions to heighten compliance incentives. Even as federal authorities expanded the tools in their
regulatory toolbox, they also expanded the policy priorities away from a
singular focus on money-laundering, terrorist financing, and identity verification towards a more comprehensive set of payments-related issues, including privacy and security, tax compliance, and the potential for use of
unfair and deceptive businesses practices in the industry. State regulatory
activity also added new policy concerns to the mix, with a primary focus on
consumer protection. Although other agencies are clearly apprised of the
possibility that decentralized ledger technology may touch on areas within
their regulatory purview, they have remained silent.
114. See Romain Dillet, Winklevoss Twins Eat, Sleep, Breathe Bitcoin, TECH(May 6, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/05/06/winklevoss-twins-eatsleep-breathe-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/22DT-2FAA] (discussing Winklevoss's
efforts to build exchange traded fund to allow trading of bitcoins on NASDAQ
OMX); Cade Metz, Overstock Will Issue a Private Bond Powered by Bitcoin Tech, WIRED
(June 5, 2015) http://www.wired.com/2015/06/overstock-will-issue-private-bond[https://perma.cc/6G6E-KLF3] (discussing Overstock
powered-bitcoin-tech/
.com's intention to offer $25 million private bond using blockchain). Although
the Shavers case involved bitcoin, the ruling did not determine whether or how
bitcoin would be regulated by the SEC and focused instead on the criminal Ponzi
scheme Shavers operated. The fact that Shavers used bitcoin to operate the Ponzi
scheme did not change the underlying nature of the criminal activity. See SEC v.
Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). For arguments that bitcoin should be considered an investment contract or a security, see
Derek A. Dion, Note, I'll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today:
Bitcoin, RegulatingFraudin the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 165,
193-94; Farmer, supra note 31, at 98-104.
115. SeeJoel Rosenblatt, Second U.S. Agent Agrees to Plead Guilty to Bitcoin Theft,
BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06[https://perma.cc/
23/second-u-s-agent-agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-bitcoin-theft
K9U9-BEV9]; Sam Thielman, Silk Road Operator Ross Ulbricht Sentenced to Life in
Prison, GUARDIAN (May 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/may/29/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-sentenced [https://perma.cc/99MH-TPE8].
CRUNCH

116. See U.S.
N. DiSr.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. AT'rv
OF CAL. AND RIPPLE LABS, INC. (2015) [hereinafter DOJ, RIPPLE SETTLE-

AGREEMENT],
available at http://www.justice.gov/file/421626/download
[https://perma.cc/DHF4-AE39].
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The collective impact of this regulatory history is that new entrants
into the decentralized ledger technology industry must tread carefully, for
fear of triggering one or more known or unknown regulatory priorities by
introducing a new and innovative application of the underlying technology. The 2015 FinCEN ruling and the SEC's silence on the Winkelvoss
endeavor is a clear example of the regulatory lacuna and its effects. Even
when given the opportunity to comment on regulation of the underlying
technology, the SEC has not done so, and when presented with a novel
application of the technology, FinCEN shoehorned it into the payments
regulatory landscape. In other words, the lacuna in the present regulatory
landscape is characterized by the lack of regulation addressing distributed
ledger technology, and the result is that, when a new use emerges, the
application may be subject to payments laws that are ill-suited to the issues
presented by the technology.
C.

The Impact of the Current Landscape: Confusion, High Risk, and
Disincentives to Innovation

The policy priorities related to bitcoin and other decentralized virtual
currencies are now relatively clear. The implementation of those policies
through existing law remains a mystery in several areas, however. As a
result, a common critique leveled at the regulatory efforts related to decentralized ledger technologies described above is that it evidences what
appears to be development and implementation absent a master plan. To
date, the United States has made great efforts to understand the unique
characteristics and potential risks of virtual currency. Nonetheless, virtual
currency hearings have not yielded any formal recommendations or guidance. As a result, regulatory bodies, courts and state legislatures have
acted independently resulting in a regulatory mishmash of guidance, clari17
fication, extension and ongoing discussion.'
The reality, however, is that the present regulatory approach to decentralized virtual currencies reflects mainstream approaches to financial
regulation generally, using a combination of ex ante and ex post regulation to mitigate systemic risk in the financial system.1 1 8 Leading literature
on approaches to financial regulation offers this insight:
Complete ex ante financial regulation, whereby regulators
prevent every failure, is [ ] a futile goal. And even if it were feasible, it would not necessarily be desirable. Ex ante regulation can
provide an incentive for regulatory arbitrage. Furthermore, any
ex ante regulation that attempts to prevent all financial failures
may end up being too chilling, thereby dampening economic
growth. Ex post remedies will therefore always be needed to try
117. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REv. 271, 304 (2015).
118. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. LJ. 193 (2008)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk].
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to prevent financial failures-when they inevitably occur-from
11 9
spreading and becoming systemic.
The regulatory history of decentralized virtual currency to date reads
like a textbook example of this commentary: a heavy emphasis on ex ante
attempts to prevent financial harm in the decentralized virtual currency
industry, complemented by ex post prosecutions of harmful activity when
failures nevertheless occurred.
Nontheless, the heavy emphasis on ex ante efforts to prevent decentralized virtual currency-related market failures when coupled with the innovative nature of the underlying technology has led to confusion and
uncertainty, while the ex post efforts to punish and correct failures highlight the high risk faced by anyone connected to the decentralized ledger
technology industry, whether working with a payments applications like
virtual currency or not. Even a cursory review of the state of the industry
supports this position. There presently exists no fully licensed, U.S.-based
decentralized virtual currency exchange.' 20 Any entity offering a product
or service connected in any way to decentralized public ledger technology
finds difficulty obtaining and maintaining banking relationships to enable
the operation of its business. 121 Furthermore, the regulatory history is replete with evidence of the practical difficulties resulting from shoehorning
decentralized ledger technologies, related applications, and the businesses
that offer products and services related to them into a regulatory scheme
first designed for centralized technologies. Compliance with the Funds
119. Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Address at Chapman Law Review Symposium: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial Regulation (Jan. 28, 2011),
in 15 CHAP. L. REV. 257, 260 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
120. Coinbase launched its exchange to claims of being the first licensed
bitcoin exchange in the United States. See Davey Alba, Coinbase Opens FirstLicensed
Bitcoin Exchange in the US, WIRED (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/01/
[https://perma.cc/3HME-UX
coinbase-opens-first-licensed-bitcoin-exchange-u-s/
LY]. However, in reality, Coinbase remains unable to obtain the requisite licenses
in all states, and even pulled out of certain states where the licensure process
proved too burdensome. See Redman, supra note 21. Similarly, itBit initially
claimed that the New York trust charter it obtained from the New York Department of Financial Institutions enabled it to lawfully operate an exchange service in
all fifty states. See Cade Metz, NY Backs BitcoinExchange. But It May Not Fly in California, WIRED (May 8, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/new-york-backs-bit
However,
coin-exchange-may-not-fly-california [https://perma.cc/LG49-FA85].
the analyses of practitioners and academics alike have failed to prove out itBit's
theory and instead openly call it into question. See id. (quoting Carol Van Cleef,
Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, as saying that charter "is not necessarily going
to be a blank pass to offer services in all states"); Houman Shadab, What itBit's
Banking Law CharterReally Means, CoINDESK (May 17, 2015), http://www.coindesk
("Nonetheless, there
[https://perma.cc/8FL5-PQ9R]
.com/in-itbit-we-trust/
seems to be some uncertainty about whether itBit-a banking law trust-automatically qualifies to do business without a money transmitter license in certain
states.").
121. See Smart, supra note 70.
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Transfer and Funds Travel Rules 122 and the valuation of virtual currency
assets when applying for money transmission licenses under statutes that
contemplate only fiat currency 123 offer two examples of such difficulties.
If the regulatory approach to decentralized ledger technologies to date is
a clear example of traditional financial regulation, and the result is confusion, uncertainty, and disincentive for innovation, the urgent question facing regulators, consumers, and entrepreneurs alike is whether an
alternative approach that nevertheless remains consistent with leading legal regulatory theory is possible.
III.

EVALUATION OF CURRENT ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY PROPOSALS
ECHOES THE GAP IN THE CURRENT APPROACH

Recognizing the inadequacy of the current regulatory approach to
the decentralized technology industry, 12 4 the current literature suggests
several alternative proposals. The proposals can be grouped into three
categories. First, various proposals attempt to apply existing law to bitcoin
and other decentralized virtual currencies by shoehorning the decentralized payment applications into a specific type of asset or property category.
Second, many commentators argue that federal financial services law
should apply to all decentralized virtual currencies in order to address the
money laundering risk, but that the remaining policy issues should be left
to the states to address. Third, a variety of proposals call for various methods and levels of self-regulation.
Notably, most of the proposals in each category focus on building a
regulatory approach to bitcoin and other decentralized virtual currencies,
and do not address regulation of the underlying decentralized ledger
technology. When the literature does turn its attention to the legal implications of decentralized ledger technology, it tends to skip the question of
how to regulate the blockchain and moves straight to jurisprudential questions of how the blockchain might disrupt or alter known legal structures
127
1 26
and judicial decision making.
such as contract law, 12 5 property law,
122. See DOJ, RIPPLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 116, at Attachment
A, paras. 13-14.
123. See WASH. DEP'T OF FIN. INSTS., Div. OF CONSUMER SERVS., INTERIM REGULATORY GUIDANCE ON VIRTUAL CURRENCY ACTIVITIES (Dec. 8, 2014), available at
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/money-transmitters/virtual-currency-interimguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL2S-LQNK] (explaining how minimum tangible net worth and permissible investment statutory requirements can be applied to
virtual currency-related businesses).
124. Some of the literature is solely dedicated to proving out the extensiveness of this inadequacy. See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 58; Tu & Meredith, supra
note 117.
125. See generally Fairfield, Bitcoin Bots, supra note 30.
126. See generally Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 13.
127. See generally Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-BasedLaw (George Wash.
Law Sch., Research Paper No. 2015-9, 2015), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2573788 [https://perma.cc/NHL7-G3MA].
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The literature leaves a significant gap, which will have a substantial
impact on both current entrepreneurial efforts to build regulatory-compliant businesses and the ability of decentralized ledger technology to actually impact the other jurisprudential questions raised by the literature.
The blockchain and other similar technologies will never revolutionize
property law, for example, if the regulatory environment is so hostile that
no software developer can risk developing the product that will spark the
revolution. To develop a regulatory approach robust enough to account
for the many uniquely beneficial aspects of decentralized ledger technology, the various market and governance failures that have historically
plagued such technologies, and the variety of forms taken by decentralized
ledger technology, and to allow for continued innovation, this Section first
develops certain criteria for evaluating alternative regulatory approaches.
This Section then weighs existing alternative regulatory proposals against
these criteria, finding that none of the current proposals meet all of the
criteria to a high degree. 128 This Section concludes by attempting to define the boundaries of the regulatory lacuna left by both the current regulatory landscape and the academic literature, thereby setting the stage for
developing a gap-filling alternative approach in Part IV.
A.

Criteriafor Evaluating Alternative Regulatory Proposals

To objectively consider whether any of the presently proposed alternative regulatory approaches adequately fill the lacunae in the current
regulatory landscape, this Article proposes the use of the following seven
standards: (1) minimize compliance risk; (2) minimize risk of illicit use;
(3) minimize malfunctions and related problems; (4) minimize data security risk; (5) minimize systemic risk; (6) promote innovation and adaptability, and (7) maximize political feasibility. These criteria are drawn from
the policy priorities reflected in the current state of decentralized ledger
technology regulation and from financial regulatory theory.
Compliance risk refers to "the risk of loss associated with non-compliance with laws, rules, regulations, prescribed practices, or ethical standards." 129 This criterion aims to capture the policy priorities that underlie
many of the ex ante regulatory measures presently applied to the decentralized ledger technology industry, including anti-money laundering and
terrorist financing controls, 130 and minimum net worth and bond require128. This approach is patterned after a common analytical tool used in public
policy literature. For an overview of the approach, see EUGENE BARDACH, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYsIs: THE EIGHTFOLD PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE PROBLEM
SOLVING 79-82 (4th ed. 2012). For examples of applications of this approach in

the legal literature more broadly, see generally Carla L. Reyes, Access to Counsel in
Removal Proceedings:A Case Study for Exploring the Legal and Societal Imperative to Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 17 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 131 (2014); Schwarcz, Systemic
Risk, supra note 118.

129. Bradford et al., supra note 86, at 35.
130. See id.
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ments found in state money transmission laws. Risk of illicit use refers to
"the risk of penalties if the failure to comply with required guidelines to
curb illicit use ... is discovered."1 3 1 This criterion reflects ex post punishments for criminal behavior using decentralized ledger technology. Malfunctions and related problems refers to "malfunctions that are the result of

unintentional circumstances or events. . . or intentional circumstances or
events .... ,132 This criterion reflects the history of malfunctions resulting
from unintentional circumstances in the decentralized ledger technology
industry, including, for example, the fork of the blockchain in March
2013,133 theft of consumer bitcoins held in trust by industry actors (such
as the case of the Mt. Gox failure),1 34 and the potential for an intentional
51% attack on the blockchain 13 5 or similar attacks on other decentralized
ledger technologies.

136

Data-security risk refers to "unauthorized modification, destruction, or
disclosure of data .... -137 Although this criterion may seem counterintuitive in the context of decentralized ledger technology, which sports encryption and cryptographic security features, the security of all
applications that interact with decentralized ledger technologies are not
created equal. This criterion is designed to ensure that any remaining
data-security risk not intrinsically addressed by the underlying technology
is addressed by consumer-facing uses of the technology. Systemic risk refers
to
[t]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X)
the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of
significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often
138
evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 34.
133. SeeJeong, supra note 48, at 5.
134. SeeYoshifumi Takemoto & Sophie Knight, Mt. Gox Filesfor Bankruptcy, Hit
with Lawsuit, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/
28/us-bitcoin-mtgox-bankruptcy-idUSBREAlROFX20140228
[https://perma.cc/
WYV3-FDUW].
135. See Daniel Cawrey, Are 51% Attacks a Real Threat to Bitcoin?, COINDESK
(June 20, 2014), http://www.coindesk.com/51-attacks-real-threat-bitcoin/ [https:/
/perma.cc/NQ9Z-ZT8J].
136. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, Long-Range Attacks: The Serious Problem with Adaptive Proof of Work, ETHEREUM BLOG (May 15, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/
2014/05/15/long-range-attacks-the-serious-problem-with-adaptive-proof-of-work/
[https://perma.cc/K7FB-TG73] (describing potential for long-range attack on
Ethereum protocol).
137. Bradford et al., supra note 86, at 34.
138. Iman Anabtawi & Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1349, 1353 (2011) (quoting Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, supra note 118, at 204).
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Although this criterion relies on a definition from financial regulatory
literature, here, it is not intended to be used only with reference to the
payments applications of decentralized ledger technologies. Rather, as
each decentralized ledger protocol represents a system, albeit not necessarily a financial system, systemic shocks may result in parallel effects. This
criterion is intended to be used by way of extrapolation, drawing parallels
between the complexities and interrelatedness of the financial system and
1 39
those of decentralized ledger technologies.
Promoting innovation and adaptabilityrefers to the ability to reduce the
lag between the law and the technology it regulates through mechanisms
designed to promote innovation and enable relatively fast regulatory adaptation to those innovations. This criterion reflects both the recognition
that decentralized ledger technology has quickly evolved and that it will
likely continue to do so. It also captures the complexity of the technology,
which like the financial system it frequently interacts with, traditionally
"innovate[s] more quickly than regulators can adapt."' 4 0 Politicalfeasibility
refers to the variety and number of actors that will support the regulatory
approach.' 4 ' Given the decentralized nature of the technology to be regulated, wide stakeholder buy-in will be crucial to the effectiveness of any
142
alternative regulatory proposal.
B.

CategorizingDecentralized Virtual Currencies as a Recognized Legal Asset

The first group
literature focuses on
gies and argues that
should be regulated

of alternative proposals presented by the academic
the payments application of decentralized technolobitcoin and related decentralized virtual currencies
as a specific type of asset, such as intangible prop-

139. Indeed, this Article has drawn such parallels throughout, including with
reference to the ex ante/ex post regulatory dichotomy and with regard to elements of the endogenous approach proposed below. This is in no way intended to
suggest that the payments applications of decentralized ledger technologies are
the focus of the analysis presented here. In fact, the opposite is intended. However, the complexity of issues, the speed of innovation, the potential for systemwide impact (both good and bad), and the number of points-of-entry for consumers are all parallels that make financial regulatory literature a useful point of reference. Notably, the analysis in this Article does not end with financial regulatory
literature. Rather, the diffuse nature of the inquiry, incorporating elements of
technology law, financial law, comparative law, and international development law,
reflects the depth of the technology and related points of regulatory inflection at
issue.
140. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 118, at 260.
141. See BARDACH, supra note 128, at 41-42 (referring to this criterion as political acceptability and defining it as "a combination of two conditions: too much opposition (which may be wide or intense or both) and/or too little support (which
may be insufficiently broad or insufficiently intense or both)").
142. SeeWright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 57 (arguing that if decentralized
ledger community does not buy-in to regulatory proposal, it could defeat it by
refusing to adopt new rules).
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erty,1 43 money,'" 44 securities, 145 uncertificated securities, 1 46 or some other
presendy recognized form of legal asset. 14 7 One of the goals of these proposals appears to be reducing uncertainty as to which legal regimes apply
to bitcoins. If bitcoins are categorically money, property, or some other
form of recognized legal asset, the path to regulatory compliance becomes
clearer: follow the traditional rules applicable to that asset. Various practical difficulties plague this approach. First, not all decentralized virtual
currencies behave in precisely the same way and therefore may not all fit
within the definition of the traditional legal asset at issue. Second, implementation issues may arise that leave the sufficiency of compliance efforts
uncertain. For example, issues of adequate implementation have plagued
even the most well-meaning industry actors with regard to compliance
with federal money service business regulations and state money transmitter laws.
Two significant theoretical difficulties face these approaches as well.
First, these approaches only consider the regulation of the payments application of decentralized ledger technologies, ignoring the underlying technology and its other potential use cases entirely. In other words, if the
primary criteria for these approaches is to provide regulatory clarity, to the
extent it does so at all, it only achieves that criteria for one application of
143. See, e.g., Rhys Bollen, The Legal Status of Online Currencies: Are Bitcoins the
Future?, 24J. BANK. & FIN. L. & PRAc. 272, 279 (2013) (arguing that "Bitcoins are a
form of intangible private property, a valuable digital artefact" and are therefore
"analogous with other forms of intangible private property, such as digital music,
shares, licenses, trademarks, copyright, goodwill, domain names, frequent flier
points and brands"); Nelson DaCunha, Virtual Property, Real Concerns, 4 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 35, 41 (2010) (noting that if decentralized virtual currencies are
form of intangible property, tort law offers one way to protect interests of both
users and service providers).
144. See Bryans, supra note 56, at 441; Nicholas A. Plassaras, Comment, RegulatingDigital Currencies: BringingBitcoin Within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 377, 403 (2013).
145. SeeJ. Scott Colesanti, Trotting Out the White Horse: How the S.E.C. Can Handle Bitcoin's Threat to American Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 38 (2014); Ruoke
Yang, When Is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18J. TECH L. & POL'Y 99,
108 (2013).
146. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial
Code (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. Law Research Paper No. 458, 2015), available at
[https://perma
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2649441
.cc/LS6G-EVF2].
147. See, e.g., Houman B. Shadab, RegulatingBitcoin and Block ChainDerivatives
(2014), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_1 00914 bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7PD42PG] (arguing
that bitcoins fall into definition of commodity under Commodity Exchange Act
and that derivative contracts that reference bitcoins are subject to regulation by
Commodity Futures Trading Commission); George K. Fogg, Perkins Coie: The UCC
and Bitcoins-Solution to Existing FatalFlaw, COINDESK (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www
[https://perma.cc/
.coindesk.com/perkins-coie-bitcoin-can-learn-real-estate-law/
72M7-XRR8] (arguing that bitcoins would presently be considered general intangibles under UCC, and presenting solution for changing that classification to
one of investment property).
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the technology, leaving the rest of the industry either in unchartered waters or, perhaps worse, attempting to comply with a regime that is ill-suited
to the technology use at issue. Second, these approaches do nothing to
resolve the underlying tension of a combined ex ante and ex post approach to regulating decentralized ledger technologies. In sum, although
these approaches address the criteria of compliance risk and illicit use to a
high degree, they do not promote innovation and adaptability, minimize
systemic risk, or solicit broad stakeholder buy-in.
C.

Applying FederalFinancialService Laws and Otherwise Deferring
to State Regulation

The second group of proposals argues that decentralized ledger technology service providers, and especially those offering a service related to
decentralized virtual currency, should remain subject to existing "customer-identification program and AML compliance program requirements of Sections 326 and 352 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and with the
economic sanctions regulations enforced by OFAC" and FinCEN regulations as appropriate, and that the remaining regulatory functions should
be left to state governments. 148 Within this second group, the proposals
for state approaches to regulation vary widely and include a recommendation to require exchanges to pay premiums to a third-party insurer of the
exchange's choice 149 and an elective
1 51

others.

tax on anonymity, 150

among

The wide variety of specific recommendations within this sec-

148. Trautman, supra note 18, at 43 (quoting The Present and Future Impact of
Virtual Currency:Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Econ. Pol'y & on Nat'l Sec. &
Int'l Trade & Fin. of the S. Banking Comm., 113th Cong. 2-3 (2013), available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=955322CC-D648-

4A00-A41F-C23BE8FF4CA (statement of Sarah Jane Hughes, Univ. Scholar & Fellow in Commercial Law, Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law)); see also Middlebrook &
Hughes, supra note 76, at 840 (noting that regulating cryptocurrencies by analogy
to existing regulatory schemes may have higher likelihood of success because
"[t] he law has a tendency to address new products and technologies by analogizing
to existing regulatory schemes"); Joshua J. Doguet, Comment, The Nature of the
Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surroundingthe Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA.
L. REv. 1119, 1147-49 (2013) (examining three regulatory approaches and arguing that compliance with existing anti-money laundering regulations offers existing opportunity to curb illicit uses of bitcoin payment system).
149. See David Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary PopularDelusions
and the Madness of Crowdfunding Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY Bus.
L. REv. 489, 554 (2014).
150. See Marian, supra note 24, at 54.
151. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 55, at 204-08 (arguing for compliance with
existing BSA and tax law and for additional prohibition of mixing technologies
and use of Tor network to enhance anonymity); Misha Tsukerman, Note, The Block
Is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and Suggestionsfor the Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127 (2015) (arguing for registry linking bitcoin wallet public keys
to user's identity). Notably, both of these proposals focus on the anonymous nature of bitcoin transactions as the primary policy problem to be addressed. See
Kaplanov, supra note 50, at 113-14 (arguing that bitcoin should be regulated as
community currency).
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ond group stems from the emphasis each proposal places on specific characteristics of decentralized virtual currency. For example, the third-party
insurance solution emphasizes the price volatility that characterizes
bitcoin and uses economic theory to suggest a way to minimize investor
risk and protect consumers against the price volatility with minimal government intervention.1 52 Meanwhile, the elective tax on anonymity seeks
to reduce what is commonly perceived as a core benefit that decentralized
virtual currencies offer to criminal masterminds: anonymity.' 5 3
Despite the variety of approaches, each of the proposals in this group
attempts to bridge the gap between the policy concerns presently voiced
by regulators and the frustration of many decentralized industry participants. In particular, many of the proposals start from the premise that the
payments applications of decentralized technologies present a real risk of
money laundering and facilitation of other criminal activity.' 54 Further,
the proposals recognize that users of decentralized payments systems face
real risk of loss of funds and other assets. 155 These proposals, however,
face difficulties similar to the first group of proposals: practical difficulties
to implementation, a singular focus on bitcoin and other payments applications of decentralized ledger technology, and proposals for regulatory
frameworks that emphasize one perceived characteristic of decentralized
virtual currencies at the expense of others. In other words, these proposals, like both the first group of proposals and current regulation, minimize
compliance risk and illicit use at the expense of innovation and adaptability. Further, these proposals lack structured consideration of issues related to minimizing malfunctions, data security, or systemic risks. Finally
these approaches will likely not garner broad stakeholder support, especially among industry stakeholders. As a result this group of proposals
generally only upholds two of the criteria to a high degree.
D. Proposalsfor Self-Regulation

The third and most prominent group of proposals calls for various
levels of industry self-regulation. 156 One such proposal argues for a threetiered self-regulatory approach. The three tiers would include: (1) the
code itself acting as law to restrain activity; (2) contractual obligations self152. See Groshoff, supra note 149, at 554.
153. See Marian, supra note 24, at 53.
154. See, e.g., id.

155. See, e.g., Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 76, at 823; Christopher,
supra note 76, at 24.
156. See, e.g., Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a LibertaINTERNET POL'y REv. 1, 10 (2014) [hereinafter De Filippi, Regulatory
Nightmare] (" [R]egulation of the protocol will most probably arise 'organically' as
bitcoin adoption increases. Accordingly, before turning to regulation, it might be
wise to first look at whether the solutions forthcoming from the market could actually provide a satisfactory answer to these aforementioned problems." (citation
omitted) (citing Henrik Karlstrom, Do Libertarians Dream of Electronic Coins? The
MaterialEmbeddedness of Bitcoin, 15 SCANDINAVIAN J. Soc. THEORY 23 (2014))).

rian Dream, 3
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imposed through a service provider's terms of service, privacy policy, and
other consumer facing documents; and (3) private lawsuits to hold service
providers "liable for all losses due to their negligence, recklessness, or disregard for" users' rights. 157 Other commentators suggest that a new body
of law, which they term "Lex Ciyptographia," will emerge as "a set of rules
administered through self-executing smart contracts and decentralized
(and potentially autonomous) organizations."' 58 Recognizing Lex
Cryptographiaas a form of self-regulation in the vein of its predecessors, Lex
Mercatoriaand Lex Informatica,Wright and De Filippi argue that "[o] ne of
the key consequences of the blockchain could be a rapid expansion of
what Lawrence Lessig referred to as 'architecture'-the code, hardware,
and structures that constrain how we behave-or at a minimum a redefinition of how laws and regulations are designed, implemented, and
enforced."

159

Although this Article contends that promoting innovation and adaptability will be a key aspect of regulating decentralized ledger technology,
these self-regulatory proposals elevate this criterion over all others. Doing
so discounts the actual market failures that have occurred since the introduction of decentralized ledger technologies, including massive loss of
consumer funds caused by the failure of large industry players, such as Mt.
Gox. 1 6 0 The self-regulatory proposals do not, however, limit their scope to
the decentralized virtual currency applications of the underlying decentralized ledger technology. Rather, it is the very recognition of the vast
and complex potential use cases for the underlying technology that causes
these writers to counsel self-regulation. Proposals for self-regulation of decentralized ledger technologies face several challenges. First, the threat of
ex post incentives for compliance has proved important to the regulatory
history of decentralized virtual currencies to date. Without the power to
impose ex post regulation, whether through enforcement activity or some
other form of ex post incentive, it is unclear how proposals for self-regulation intend to address the compliance, illicit use, and malfunction risk
criteria. Second, Lex Mercatoria and Lex Informatica largely provide rules

for the private sphere, while many of the core policy concerns facing
decentralized ledger technology industry implicate matters of public
as well. As a result, a self-regulatory approach, including a
Cryptographia that follows the pattern of its predecessors and focuses
rules for the private sphere, will be ill-suited to address systemic risk.

157. DaCunha, supra note 143, at 45, 58, 71.
158. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 48.
159. Id. at 50 (footnote omitted) (citing LAWRENCE
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE VERSION

LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER
LESSIG, CODE

2.0, at 24 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter

AND OTHER LAWS]).

160. See Takemoto & Knight, supra note 134.

the
law
Lex
on
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E.

Crystalizing the Problem and Defining the Boundaries
of the Regulatory Lacuna

Taken as a whole, the present alternative regulatory proposals focus
on the same policy priorities as the current regulatory approach: focusing
overwhelmingly on the payments applications of decentralized ledger
technologies, curbing illicit uses of such payments applications, reducing
the perceived extreme level of anonymity afforded to use of such payments applications, protecting consumers from financial loss, and predominately focusing on ex ante measures followed by ex post
supplemental enforcement actions as necessary. Furthermore, both the
current regulatory landscape and the alternative proposals focus their efforts on the centralized actors in the ecosystem. Although this approach
arguably worked well with regard to regulating the Internet, 161 it appears
to be experiencing higher levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the
context of decentralized ledger technologies. As regulation of the Internet experienced in the 1990s, so regulation of decentralized ledger
technologies is experiencing now: a lacuna in the regulatory approach
that results in law lag. Regulation that focuses on the centralized actors in
a decentralized ecosystem simply will not be able to keep pace. There is
some level of urgency related to addressing the law lag, as the level of
16 2
decentralization in the ecosystem is only expected to grow.

The above discussion reveals four core elements of the gap between
law and decentralized ledger technology that is causing the law lag. First,
the complete failure to regulate at the decentralized ledger level rather
than the payments application level occupies a large place in the regulatory gap. This failure implicates two of the criteria: promoting innovation
and adaptability and minimizing systemic risk. Second, the current and
alternative approaches are overly reactive to the past bitcoin market failures. The heavy emphasis on anti-money laundering and curbing other
illicit uses are directly reactive to the Mt. Gox failure, and the E-Gold,
Liberty Reserve, and Silk Road enforcement actions. Similar to the pattern of overreacting to past crises that characterizes most existing financial
regulation, 1 6 3 this reactive approach implicates the criteria of compliance,
illicit use, malfunction, and data security risks. Third, the present and proposed alternative regulatory approaches are grounded in the characteristics of bitcoin and decentralized virtual currencies as they appear at
present. This artificially ties effective regulation to a specific moment in
time and a specific market context. Again, this flaw echoes that of existing
financial regulation more generally' 64 and implicates the innovation and
161. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 55.
162. See id. at 56-58; see alsoAbramowicz, supra note 127; Fairfield, BitcoinBots,
supra note 30.

163. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 138, at 1351.
164. See id. at 1369 ("It is our view, however, that additional measures are, and
will continue to be, needed to protect the financial system from unforeseen economic shocks. In part, this is because the measures that have been adopted re-
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adaptability and systemic risk criteria. Finally, it remains unclear whether
the mishmash of ex ante and ex post regulation is purposeful or simply
the result of various regulators applying existing laws to an emerging technology. When viewed in this light, the regulatory gap crystalizes and may
be problematized in the following manner: what regulatory approach (ex
ante, ex post, a combination of both, or neither) will treat decentralized
ledger technology holistically, including taking a balanced approach to
rectifying past crises, without tying regulation to specific implementations
or applications of the technology, while maximizing the seven criteria to a
high degree?
IV.

FILLING THE

GAP

WITH AN ENDOGENOUS THEORY OF DECENTRALIZED

TECHNOLOGY REGULATION: AN INITIAL PROPOSAL

Current regulation of decentralized virtual currencies and the existing literature assume that the form of regulation is limited to the following dichotomy: "[S]elf-regulation (i.e. through market-based mechanisms,
or with the support of a private regulatory body like the Bitcoin Foundation) or by means of state regulation."1 65 This Article, however, has
demonstrated that neither choice effectively incentivizes decentralized
technology ecosystem participants to prevent the market and governance
failures that primarily concern regulators. This Article therefore challenges the conventional dichotomy and proposes a third alternative: an
endogenous model of regulation that simultaneously governs from within
and without, and sidesteps the ex ante/ex post regulatory choice by building compliance into the protocol and thereby eliminating the need for
incentives. In so doing, this Article investigates the impact that decentralized technologies will have on the regulatory exercise itself.
A.

An Endogenous Theory of Regulationfor Decentralized Ledger Technologies

The concept of endogenous regulation can be found in various
branches of academic literature, including economics, development, comparative law, and financial regulation. This Article suggests an approach
to endogenous regulation that relies on insights from each of these areas
in order to meet the criteria for decentralized ledger technology regulation identified above in Part III(A) and fill the regulatory lacuna identified
in Parts II and III above. Synthesizing the various commentaries regarding
endogenous regulation leads to an approach that is iterative, cooperative,
focused on the functional purposes for enacting regulation, and implemented from within the market requiring regulation.
spond to practices specific to the recent global financial crisis, rather than
addressing its fundamental causes.").
165. De Filippi, Regulatory Nightmare, supra note 156, at 10.
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Generally speaking, the term endogenous refers to the concept of
"[h]aving an internal cause or origin. '166 For economists, "It] he theory of
endogenous policy describes how self-interested agents influence the
choices made regarding government policies.' 67 In particular economic
theory considers the endogenous evolution of regulation as one that is
"incremental, and continuous, producing small effects at each individual
step but cumulatively resulting in ever deeper levels of cooperation."' 68
Economic development literature similarly conceptualizes an endogenous
approach as an iterative and cooperative one, in which "the distinctiveness
of individual cultures and societies should be at the center of determining
the goals to be pursued." 169 This approach links culture to development
and argues that because the other system possesses a unique cultural identity, it should be "entitled to freely choose [its] own method [ ] for achieving full political and economic independence." 170 The contribution of
endogenous development theory relevant to the present regulatory inquiry is the premise that when promoting development in another system,
whether through the imposition of new regulations 7 or otherwise, it is

166. Endogenous, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
us/definition/american-english/endogenous
[https://perma.cc/DZ7D-A9RC]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
167. ISIDORo ADOLFO MAZZA, An Endogenous Policy Model of HierarchicalGovernment, in ESSAYS ON ENDOGENOUS ECONOMIC POLICY 11, 11 (2009).
168. Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in InternationalOrganizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 665 (2006); see also
Stanley Reiter, On Endogenous Economic Regulation, 2 ECON. DESIGN 211, 211-14
(1996) (setting forth economic game theory underlying endogenous economic
regulatory approach and describing it as iterative game process in which interactions between regulators and economic actors they regulate in one phase construct
rules and regulations that govern next phase).
169. Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, DeconstructingDevelopment, 22 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 1, 35 n.153 (2004).
170. Edmund H. Chiang, Note, The UAESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of CulturalExpressions: A Look at the Convention and Its Potential Impact on the American Movie Industry, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 379, 392
n. 81 (2007) (citing Ivan Bernier, A UNESCO International Convention on Cultural
Diversity, in FREE TRADE VERSUS CULTURAL DrVERSTY: WTO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE
FIELD OF AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES 65, 72 (Cristoph Beat Graver, Michael Girsberger &
Mira Nenova eds., 2004)).
171. Modernizing legal norms (by patterning them off of Western institutions) has long been considered a method for promoting economic development.
For a brief history and description of the law and development movement, see
Gordon & Sylvester, supranote 169, at 18-23; see also AmandaJ. Perry, International
Economic Organizations and the Modem Law and Development Movement, in MAKING
DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION

AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 19 (Ann Seidman, Robert B. Seidman & Thomas W.
Walde eds., 1999); David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance:
Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CITICAL
APPRAISAL 74 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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necessary to understand "the ways in which local innovations and gains
172
can be preserved as part of local economic and cultural power."
The financial regulatory literature also explores an endogenous or
functional approach to regulation.'

73

The functional approach to finan-

cial regulation argues that in order to regulate "a dynamically changing
financial system," which rapidly changes in unexpected ways, "it may be
more effective-or at least instructive-to focus on the system's underlying, and thus less time-dependent, economic functions than to tie regulation to any specific financial architecture."1 74 A functional approach is
desirable, the theory argues, because it is well-suited to "analysis of a highly
complex or unknown structure" and it "facilitates the analysis of a rapidly
1 75
changing structure," both of which are qualities of the financial system.
Comparative legal theory describes a similar approach to understanding regulation and, in particular, a methodology for determining the relevant functions of a system to be regulated, and the appropriate institution
with which to achieve that regulation through the concept of the functional method. 176 The central idea of the comparative functional method
is that of functional equivalence, which suggests that "similar functional
needs [of society] can be fulfilled by different institutions .... -177 Functional equivalence posits that social problems are generally universal, but
the legal and institutional response to universal social problems need not
be. 178 As a result, the functional method
172. Natsu Taylor Saito, Decolonization, Development, and Denial, 6 FLA. A & M
U. L. REv. 1, 45 (2010) (quoting ARTURO ESCOBAR, ENCOUNTERING DEVELOPMENT:
THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE THIRD WORLD 98 (1995)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).
173. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating FinancialChange: A Functional
Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Functional
Approach], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=24694
67 [perma.cc/V2DH-HUDM].
174. Id. at 5-6.
175. Id. at 6.
176. The functional method as used in the comparative legal enterprise is
designed to help a comparative legal scholar understand the way that a foreign
legal system approaches a particular problem through regulation. This Article suggests that this same approach can be used to consider how to approach a particular
problem in a foreign system, with decentralized ledger technology being the foreign system. On the idea of code-as-law, which leads to the conception of decentralized ledger technology as a foreign legal system, see Lessig, Open Code and Open
Societies, supra note 25.
177. Ralf Michaels, The FunctionalMethod of ComparativeLaw, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 357 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); see also KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COM-

PARATIVE LAw 34 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d rev. ed. 1998) (1977).
178. See Esin Orficfi, Developing Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE LAw: A
HANDBOOK 43, 51 (Esin Ordcdi & David Nelken eds., 2007). Stated another way, "if
a society has a certain problem a, it must have a legal institution y, and different
solutions to a are functionally equivalent." Michaels, supra note 177, at 371.
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aims at explaining the effects of legal institutions as functions...
and it promises to look at non-legal responses to societal requisites, too. The functional method asks us to understand legal institutions not as doctrinal constructs but as societal responses to
problems-not as isolated instances but in their relation to the
179
whole legal system, and beyond, to the whole of society.
The functional method forces comparative legal scholars to shed the assumption that the absence of a certain legal structure means that the society does not address the social problem the structure is designed to
resolve. 180 Instead, comparative theorists look at the legal and social context of the foreign system as a whole, with the goal of uncovering a functional equivalent-another institution that, although different in
structure, serves the same purpose.18 1
Comparative legal scholars have developed a methodology for uncovering functional equivalents in foreign legal systems. 182 The first step in
functional equivalence analysis is to ask what social problem a certain legal
institution seeks to resolve. 183 In framing this question, comparative theorists seek to eliminate any reference to concepts in their own legal system,
but rather state the question in "purely functional terms. 1 84 The next
step in the functional method is to search the foreign system for the legal
institution responding to the social problem posed. Comparative theorists
undertaking this research are obligated to explore all aspects of the foreign system and not expect the legal construct to appear in the same form
185
and context as in the native legal system.
179. Michaels, supra note 177, at 364.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Comparative legal scholarship has debated the relative importance of
the functional method as opposed to other approaches to comparative law. See
generallyJaakko Husa, Farewell to Functionalismor MethodologicalTolerance?, 67 RABELS
ZEITSCHRFTr 419 (2003) [hereinafter Husa, Farewell to Functionalism] (providing review of debate and arguing for "moderate version of functionalism"). To clarify,
the functional method is one of several approaches to micro-comparison, including the study of legal transplants. See Michele Graziadei, The FunctionalistHeritage,
in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 100, 100 (Pierre

Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003). The functional method and legal transplants, however, are of particular value to the rule of law development enterprise,
and for that reason, are discussed in more detail than other approaches.
183. See Michaels, supra note 177, at 366.
184. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 177, at 34 (demonstrating, through example, that question should not be "What formal requirements are there for sales
contacts in foreign law?" but rather, "How does foreign law protect parties from
surprise, or from being held to an agreement not seriously intended?" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
185. Id. at 35 ("Even experienced comparatists sometimes look for the rule
they want only in the particular place in the foreign system where their experience
of their own system leads them to expect it: they are unconsciously looking at the
problem with the eyes of their own system.").

226

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: p. 191

In the event that a search of the foreign legal system fails to produce
an institution designed to address the problem, the next step for comparative theorists is to ask why the legal system does not provide such an institution.1 8 6 This step in functional methodology forces comparative
theorists to search the entire foreign system, rather than narrowly focusing
on the legal system. 18 7 In particular, comparative theorists investigate the
foreign system's cultural and customary norms in search of an institution
that addresses the problem.18 8 By the end of the comparative endeavor,
comparative theorists have either discovered a functionally equivalent institution, or have discovered the reason for the absence of one.18 9
As a result of the functional method, comparative theorists "know that
law, just like culture, is not monolithic." 190 Instead of prescribing which
laws work best, the comparative functional method "sets out to understand
what makes law work." 19 1 By beginning the inquiry with the social function of law, 192 the comparative functional method creates a framework in
which it is possible to avoid "the problem that one perceives the foreign
systems mainly through the mind-set of one's own legal system."' 193 In doing so, the functional method enables the comparative theorists to conceive of possible reasonable substitutes, rather than assume that one set of
institutions is essential for meeting a certain set of regulatory criteria.
Ultimately, then, in undertaking the micro-comparison enterprise
through the functional method, the first question is not, How can this specific institution be successfully transplanted?but rather, Which institution can be
transplanted that would successfully address the problem? If decentralized

ledger technology is considered a "foreign system," with protocol rules
that govern its usage and a coding language all its own, the comparative
functional method becomes a core element of an endogenous approach
to decentralized ledger technology development. Essentially, when combined with foundational concepts from functional financial regulation, endogenous economic regulation, and endogenous development, the
comparative functional method offers regulators a tool for engaging in a
two-way regulation design process that requires the participation of core
developers in the decentralized ledger technology ecosystem. By doing so,
the construct of an endogenous or functional approach to regulating de186.
187.
188.
189.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.

190. Graziadei, supra note 182, at 115.
191. Id.
192. See Husa, Farewell to Functionalism, supra note 182, at 423; Jaakko Husa,
About the Methodology of Comparative Law - Some Comments Concerning the Wonderland. . . 8 (Univ. of Maastricht Faculty of Law, Working Paper No. 2007/5, 2007)
[hereinafter Husa, Wonderland] ("The point of departure for comparison ought to
be .. .the socio-legal function.").
193. Husa, Farewell to Functionalism,supra note 182, at 423; see also Husa, Wonderland, supra note 192, at 8.
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centralized ledger technology has the potential to meet a majority of the
criteria set forth in Part III above to a high degree and therefore offers a
potential avenue for filling the gap in the current regulatory landscape
and academic literature. Because it is difficult to assess the fulfillment of
the criteria in the abstract, this Article next offers one possible implementation and uses it to demonstrate the capacity for endogenous regulation
to offer flexible, adaptable, and feasible regulation that minimizes a variety of risks to a high degree.
B.

Technology-Assisted Regulation: A Proposed Implementation of Endogenous
Regulation in the Decentralized Ledger Technology Ecosystem

Taking the various strands of endogenous and functional regulation
together reveals a synthesized approach that is iterative, cooperative, focused on the functional purposes for enacting regulation, and implemented from within the market requiring regulation. These are the core
elements of the endogenous theory of decentralized ledger technology
proposed here. Taking the last element first, this Article proposes that
regulation of decentralized ledger technology should build on the body of
literature, most prominently led by Lawrence Lessig, that argues for the
use of code-as-law. 194 The proposal here is not for allowing the industry to
self-regulate through rules created by use of the blockchain or other similar technologies.1 95 Nor is this a proposal for using smart contracts to
create a code of law that enables the regulation of private actors and decentralized autonomous organizations) 9 6 Finally, this is not a proposal
for layering law on top of technology architecture in order to form a com194. See, e.g., LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supra note 159, at 24; Lawrence
Lessig, Foreword, 52 STAN. L. REv. 987, 990 (2000) (explaining that phrase "[c]odeis
lad' was meant "[m]etaphorically, in that the code controls behavior as law might
control behavior" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Lessig's conception of
code-as-law, the idea is that writers of code, private actors, constrain behavior as
they write rules into the code. See Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies, supra note
25, at 1408.
The code of cyberspace-whether the Internet, or a net within the Internet-defines that space. It constitutes that space. And as with any
constitution, it builds within itself a set of values and possibilities that
And the design of code is something that people
governs life there ....
are doing. Engineers make the choices about how the world will be. Engineers in this sense are governors.
Id.
The proposal here builds Lessig's conception of code-as-law into law-through-code,
or technology-assisted regulation, something that Lessig doubted could be
achieved in an open source environment. See infra note 219 and accompanying
text.
195. See generally De Filippi, Regulatory Nightmare, supra note 156; David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 1367, 1391-95 (1996).
196. In other words, this is not a proposal in the same vein as Wright & De
Filippi's Lex Cryptographia. See generally Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2.

228

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: p. 191

plete regulatory picture. 197 Rather, this is a proposal that regulators undertake the dual task of enacting a law or regulation via statute, and then
implementing that statute through code, so that it is endogenously incorporated into the decentralized ledger technology or applications running
on top of the technology. In other words, while several commentators
have suggested that increasingly complex systems of smart contracts can
be used to create new rules and constructs for organizations, 1 98 corporate
entities, 19 9 property, 200 and government bodies, 20 1 this proposal contests
that the first and primary target for regulation-through-code is the technology itself. In this way, the endogenous theory of regulation advanced
here reflects Lessig's suggestion that
[r]egulation in cyberspace is, or can be, different. If the regulator wants to induce a certain behavior, she need not threaten,
or cajole, to inspire the change. She need only change the
code-the software that defines the terms upon which the indi20 2
vidual gains access to the system, or uses assets on the system.
Achieving such implementation of regulation-through-code, which
this Article will refer to as technology-assisted regulation, will organically
require that regulators adopt the other elements of the endogenous approach. Namely, because the writing of code is limited by certain properties of the protocol, regulators will be unable to craft the requisite rules
without cooperating with members of the decentralized ledger technology
ecosystem. Further, only an iterative process of incorporation and feedback will lead both the drafters of statute and the writers of code to a place
of thoughtful and meaningful regulation. Finally, cooperation between
regulators and industry members in an iterative process will inevitably lead
to discussions about the functional purpose of current regulation and how
to translate those purposes into mechanisms that serve as a functional
equivalent within the code. If such a level of cooperation could be
achieved, the criteria of political feasibility would be met to a high degree,
as buy-in would be required of regulators and industry members alike.
197. See LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAws, supra note 159, at 123 (arguing that
regulation is composed of various levels of constraints, including laws, market, social norms, and architecture (including code)); see also DaCunha, supra note 143,
at 58, 64, 68 (arguing for three layers of bitcoin regulation); Andy Yee, Internet
Architecture and the Layers Principle:A Conceptual Framework for Regulating Bitcoin, 3
INTERNET POL'Y REv. 1 (2014).

198. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 50.
199. See Mihaela Ulieru, Organic Governance Through the Logic of Holonic Systems,
in FROM BITCOIN TO BURNING MAN AND BEYOND: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY AND AuTONOMY IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY, supra note 75, at 113, 128.
200. See generally Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 13.
201. See generally Abramowicz, supra note 127.
202. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1408
(1996).
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Writing regulation into the code is not only possible, but is organic to
the system. It is possible that an interaction between the decentralized
ledger technology industry and regulators could be coordinated through a
centralized entity representing the community, such as the Bitcoin Foundation, 203 the Digital Asset Transfer Authority (DATA), 20 4 or a similar organization created specifically for this purpose. However, the chosen
organization may dissolve while the need for regulation would remain
constant. As a result, coordinating the cooperative, iterative endogenous
regulation process through such a centralized entity, while familiar to regulators, may not be the most beneficial in the long run. In any event, such
efforts need not be implemented through a centralized organization.
"There is evidence that community consensus can result in the resolution
of' issues related to decentralized public ledger maintenance.20 5 As such,
"if the [decentralized ledger technology] network came to a consensus
about modifying the rules," the rules of the system could change.20 6 In
fact, it is likely that much decentralized public ledger maintenance is conducted by a small group of core developers and a handful of additional
volunteers recruited by the core team. 20 7 Moreover, many of the prominent decentralized ledgers have adopted such a structure, 20 8 and evidence
shows that "large successful open source projects typically have a benevolent dictator who makes decisions." 20 9 Furthermore, decentralized ledger
technologies and, in particular, the payments applications that run on
them, arguably already contain "a number of economic rules that serve as
monetary policy enacted in code."2 10 In fact, the very issues of who can
conduct transactions, under what circumstances and when, are all deter21 1
mined by rules built into the protocol.
By leveraging smart contracts and other features of decentralized
ledger technologies, regulation can be implemented at a systemic, decentralized ledger technology level, as opposed to an application-specific level
(e.g., focusing solely on payments). In doing so, this proposal fulfills two
criteria to a high degree: minimizing systemic risk and promoting innovation and adaptability. Implementing regulation from within the code it203. See BITCOIN

FOUNDATION,

http://bitcoinfoundation.org/

[https://per

ma.cc/2SJZ-SQUS] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
204. See DATA ASSET TRANSFER AUTHORITY, http://info.datauthority.org/wordpress/ [https://perma.cc/QG8R-T7DR] (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
205. Jeong, supra note 48, at 31.
206. Id. at 5.
207. See David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other DecentralizedPublicLedger Currency Platforms 15 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 685, 2014), available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=2349&context=law andeconomics [https://perma.cc/2T2D-X6
SA].
208. See id. at 16.
209. Id. at 15 (citing CHARLES M. SCHwEiK & ROBERT C. ENGLISH, INTERNET
SUCCESS: A STUDY OF OPEN-SOURCE SovrwARE COMMONS (2012)).

210. Jeong, supra note 48, at 5.
211. See De Filippi, Regulatory Nightmare, supra note 156, at 1.
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self promises an opportunity to create system-wide mechanisms for
absorbing shocks such as market or institutional failure triggers. Further,
212
like the financial system, "technology evolves in an unpredictable way"
and at a rapid pace. This is particularly true of decentralized ledger technologies, which only first emerged in 2009 and are already disrupting
traditional markets and legal structures. Regulation at the decentralized
ledger technology level will help avoid "[t]he danger [ ] that [blockchain]
technologies as a whole may be cabined to one use case by the development of a specific legal regime, say, payments and money transmission
services, and not left open to other potential uses."2 1 3 Further, a functional approach to regulation, once built-in at a code-as-law level, and
once supplemented by a formal decentralized consensus mechanism for
updating regulation to reflect protocol and software changes in real
time, 214 promises to keep pace with the changes in technology and decrease the length of the law lag that presently plagues the decentralized
ledger technology industry. Fulfilling these criteria to a high degree is
among the key contributions of this regulatory approach, as neither the
current landscape nor current alternative proposals feature these
characteristics.
A third key contribution of this approach regards minimizing compliance risk and the risk of illicit use. 2 1 5 Here, the heart of the regulatory
exercise comes into motion: Will regulation seek to minimize such risks
via ex ante or ex post measures? What if this dichotomy could be eliminated? If the system incorporates regulation-through-code, self-executing
code will be regulatory-compliant, and the choice presented to individual
actors will no longer be whether to comply or not, but will merely be
whether or not to use the system. 216 When viewed in this light, the prospect of regulating decentralized ledger technology from within raises is-

212. ANTONIO VAZQUEZ-BARQUERO, ENDOGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: NETWORKING,
INNOVATION, INSTITUTIONS AND CITIES 77 (2002).
213. Fairfield, BitProperty, supra note 13, at 869.
214. I note here that the economic literature occasionally makes reference to
a slow pace of endogenous changes. This appears to be a general reference to the
time required for the endogenous regulatory effort to take root. I recognize this
potential difficulty to the proposed approach and discuss it more fully in infra note
219 and accompanying text.
215. It is not presently clear that endogenous regulation will make any further contribution to minimizing data security risk, malfunctions, or related unintended problems other than that which is already present in the protocols. One
issue that might be addressed through the functional method inquiry is the issue
of privacy of financial information on a public ledger, especially as adoption becomes more widespread, or if mainstream banks adopt use of decentralized ledger
technology. For now, however, these criteria are considered a wash-neither enhancing nor detracting from the suitability of the proposed endogenous regulatory approach.
216. See LEssIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supranote 159, at 125 ("The code or
software or architecture or protocols set these features, which are selected by code
writers. They constrain some behavior by making other behavior possible or impossible. The code embeds certain values or makes certain values impossible.").
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sues more important to regulatory theory than simply how to approach
the regulation of decentralized ledger technology, or the subset of related
applications that includes bitcoin. Rather, the possibility of endogenous
regulation of decentralized ledger technology raises the possibility of disrupting the regulatory exercise as we know it. This is a particularly distinct
possibility in the financial regulation realm for several reasons.
First, as this Article has noted throughout, regulation of decentralized
ledger technology poses many of the same challenges as regulation of the
financial system. Second, significant financial industry actors are moving
to incorporate decentralized ledger technology into the mainstream financial system. 217 If decentralized ledger technology can make an endogenous theory of financial regulation or a functional approach to financial
regulation 218 a practical reality and, if it can go a step further to enhance
innovation and the ability of regulators to keep pace with such innovation,
solving the riddle of how to regulate the blockchain and similar technologies will have far more significant consequences than alleviating the immediate regulatory quagmire facing the businesses in the decentralized
ledger technology ecosystem.
C.

Challenges to Implementation and a Call for Further Research

The above proposal lays out the foundation for pursuing endogenous
regulation of decentralized ledger technologies, through a cooperative,
iterative process that focuses on the functional purposes for enacting regulation, implemented from within the system requiring regulation. The
proposal may, however, face various practical and theoretical challenges to
adoption and implementation. First, it is not clear the extent to which
endogenous regulation meets the criteria of political feasibility. It may be
impossible to know the extent of stakeholder buy-in to the approach until
after initial regulatory proposals are presented to the development team
for integration into the code. This could pose a powerful practical obstacle to the endogenous regulatory enterprise. As Wright and Filippi
explain:
[T]he open nature of blockchain-based architecture means that
most, if not all of the applications deployed on the blockchain
could be reproduced and adjusted by anyone, in order to fulfill
different functions and satisfy the needs of different groups and
communities. As a result, dictating the manner in which software
developers design a particular application protocol, or forcing
software developers to introduce a particular feature into the
code will only work to the extent that the user-base actually
217. See Yessi Bello Perez, 8 Banking Giants Embracing Bitcoin and Blockchain

Tech, COINDESK (July 27, 2015),

http://www.coindesk.com/8-banking-giants-

bitcoin-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/Z4UK-GPS3].
218. See generally Schwarcz, Functional Approach, supra note 173.
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agrees to switch to the new protocol. Failure to reach consensus
2 19
amongst users means that software will remain in use.
Another practical challenge to adopting endogenous regulation is the
time that it may take to get the cooperative, iterative process up and running, and to put a consensus building mechanism into place that will allow
regulators and the core development teams to gauge the political feasibility of any specific regulation being considered for inclusion as regulationthrough-code. The economic and development literature both hint at a
view that the endogenous approach is a slow method. 220 Such delays may
temporarily increase the law lag, but not more so than if no new regulatory approach is taken.
A third challenge to adopting and implementing endogenous regulation of decentralized ledger technology is a theoretical one. Assuming the
regulator determines to adopt this proposal for technology-assisted regulation and assuming the regulator uses the functional method to determine
that the decentralized ledger technology already contains a mechanism
approximating the same function as the real-world regulation intended to
be imposed through code-as-law, "how should law regulate" under such
circumstances? 22 1 Should the law change in response to the differences
found in the code, "[o] r should the law try to change the features of cyberspace, to make them conform to the law? And if the latter, then what
constraints should there be on the law's effort to change cyberspace's
'nature'?" 22 2
Each of these challenges makes clear that further research into the
practical, technical, and theoretical viability of wide-scale endogenous regulation of decentralized ledger technology is necessary. Further research
into the implications of a successful implementation of this approach
would also be useful. In particular, further exploration of the impact of
technology-assisted regulation, or regulation-through-code, on the ex
219. Wright & De Filippi, supra note 2, at 57; see also Lawrence Lessig, The
Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH.

L.J. 759, 764 (1999) ("Whether government can regulate code depends in part
upon who controls that code. If the code is closed-controlled by private
for-profit organizations-then government's power is assured. But if the code
is open-outside of the control of any particular private for-profit
organization-then the government's power is threatened."). While evidence suggests that the issue is no longer as black and white as Lessig would lead readers to
believe, the point is well taken that the open source nature of decentralized ledger
technologies may pose a practical challenge to implementing technology-assisted
regulation.
220. See Helfer, supra note 168, at 665 (describing iterative process proposed
here as "endogenous, incremental, and continuous, producing small effects at
each individual step but cumulatively resulting in ever deeper levels of cooperation"); see also Reiter, supra note 168, at 211-14 (describing iterative process as one
that occurs over time).
221. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARv. L. REv. 501, 505 (1999).
222. Id.
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ante/ex post dichotomy is warranted in light of industry moves to integrate decentralized ledger technology into the mainstream financial system. Finally, examining whether comparative law's functional method
offers some insight into the limits to be imposed upon regulators who
elect to use technology-assisted regulation as a policy tool will be critical to
ensuring that an endogenous approach to regulation remains cooperative,
iterative, and properly focused on function and regulation from within.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article presents a framework for regulating decentralized technology in a holistic, organic, and functional way-an endogenous way.
The current patchwork of regulations applied to businesses using decentralized ledger technology is compromised by its inability to adapt to the
technology, its inefficient mechanisms for responding to market and governance failures, and its overwhelming tendency to quash innovation in
the name of preventing crime and protecting consumers. Alternative regulatory methods proposed to date often fall victim to the same shortcomings. Most such alternative proposals center on regulating payments
applications of decentralized technology, such as bitcoin, without regard
to the collateral damage caused to other innovative uses of blockchain
technology. Proposals that attempt to focus on the novel characteristics of
the technology similarly focus on only a subset of novel characteristics, at
the expense of the others. To the extent that the present literature discusses decentralized technology through a holistic lens, its inquiry centers
on ways new applications (other than payments applications) of decentralized technology may evolve and disrupt the established order. Such literature often bypasses the most pressing current question facing the very
innovators who hope to disrupt technology use as we know it: What regulatory approach to the decentralized ledger technology itself can keep pace
with innovation while still addressing common market and governance
failures? The endogenous theory of regulation proposed in this Article
attempts to fill that lacuna.
Importantly, an endogenous approach to regulation will only be effective if each of the relevant stakeholders actively participates. The current regulatory nightmare facing decentralized virtual currencies and
decentralized ledger technologies is a result of more than just the mismatch resulting from the application of antiquated laws to revolutionary
technology. It also stems from a long history of boisterous, bad industry
actors, high volumes of monetary losses suffered by consumers, and unsubstantiated myths regarding the level of anonymity and impunity afforded
to criminals using the technology. Dispelling such myths and charting a
new industry course will require a collaborative effort between industry
actors and regulators. By working together and leveraging the consensus
properties of decentralized technologies, industry actors and regulators
are well-placed to make technology-assisted regulation, which this Article
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submits should be viewed as a practical application of architecture-as-law
or code-as-law, a reality. Such endogenous regulation offers unique compliance incentives and stakeholder buy-in that should enable more efficient ex ante regulation while simultaneously reducing the need for
expensive coercive enforcement action. Finally, if the endogenous regulation of decentralized ledger technology such as the blockchain proposed
in this Article could be achieved, it might pave the way for an entirely new
approach to financial regulation: technology-assisted regulation, or regulation-through-code, that bypasses the ex ante/ex post dichotomy and influences actions in real time.

